May 4 1964
From The Space Library
Appearing at Project Ranger hearings before Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Admin-istrator James E. Webb cited recent management changes by Cal Tech and JPL in the continuing evolutionary process of management relations with NASA: "These changes and continuing improvements are the result of management cooperation and responsiveness over a wide range of complex problems; the new contract we hope to sign soon is a further example of this effort. In this contract, NASA will endeavor to add to the existing system an incentive fee approach, a separate facilities man-agement contract, a joint semi-annual review with CIT of progress and problems, and a revised overhead determination method. We will discard the concept of mutual agreement at the level of every task and replace it with a contractual statement of our current practice, i.e., laboratory acceptance of NASA program direction, after of course, a full presentation of its views. "This represents the position we have achieved in our negotiations looking toward the new contract for the period beginning January 1, 1965. However, NASA has made it clear that it wishes to see the agreed upon relationship put into action prior to final execution of the con-tractual document This is a prudent way to avoid overlooking some aspect or approach which might yield better results than those we have reduced to contract language in our negotiations. . . ." Mr. Webb discussed the report on RANGER VI he had sent to Chairman Miller and Chairman Anderson: "This was an important flight; the entire country desired its success. When it did not meet its mission objectives, I felt it was our responsibility to examine the reasons there-fore and to report these to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Com-mittees. The report made was the assessment of Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans and myself of the technical problems we have encountered and of the possible causes of failure. The Ranger 6 failed because something did not work, not because someone did not work. There had been unstinting effort dedicated to its success; this effort will be combined with lessons learned from the Ranger 6 failure to provide the best assurance of Ranger 7 success. We have invested the energy of some of the best minds of the country in Project Ranger and we expect to capitalize on that investment in both the near and the far future." (Testimony)
At conclusion of Ranger management hearings by Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Sub-committee Chairman Rep. Joseph E Karth (D.-Minn.) remarked that testimony "indicated to me that there was a serious loss of NASA liaison or NASA management. This, I think, is primarily the question that is before the subcommittee, having arrived at the conclusion . . . that the professional, technical people at Cal Tech are extremely able peo-ple. . . ." (M&R, 5/11/64, 15)
General B. A. Schriever, AFSC Commander, announced organization for National Range Division (NRD), commanded by Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis. Air Force Missile Test Center, Patrick AFB, Fla., was redesig-nated Air Force Eastern Test Range (ETR), and Air Force Space Test Center (Provisional) at Vandenberg AFB was redesignated the Air Force Western Test Range ( WTR) . Both ranges would be assigned to NRD. General Davis also was assigned responsibility for Satellite Control Facility (SCF) , Sunnyvale, Calif., which has operated DOD R&D satellite tracking and control facilities. With Hq. at Andrews AFB, General Davis would function as both NRD Commander and AFSC Deputy Com-mander for Global Range. (AFSC Release 45-R-50)
Inserting in Congressional Record a Saturday Evening Post article entitled "The Great A-11 Deception," Sen. Gordon L. Allott (R.-Colo.) re-marked that the A-11 had "caused me a great deal of concern. . . I still believe it is an outrageous imposition on our system when $500 million or more is spent on an airplane which may be an interceptor or may not be, but which very few-and only a few-of the people in the Government knew about, including even some of the highest ranking military people." (CR, 5/4/64, 9579-81)
President Johnson announced formation of 32-member FAA Women's Ad-visory Committee on Aviation, following ceremony at the White House in which he presented FAA Decoration for Exceptional Service to Mrs. Jerrie Mock for her recent 22,858-mi. global solo flight. Mrs. Philip A. Hart was named committee chairman and Mrs. Mock, vice chairman. (FAA Release 64 41)
H. J. High Construction Co. received $1,012,800 NASA contract for con-struction of third-floor addition to Operations and Checkout Building, John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA (Merritt Island) . Army Corps of Engineers awarded the fixed-price contract. (DOD Release 357-64)
Unique cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract used by USAF for Titan III launch vehicle imposed "strict penalties on the prime contractor [Martin Co.] for deviating from the target cost, schedule, or flight-performance objectives," Missiles and Rockets reported. DOD officials said Titan III was "on schedule and within the planned funding." (M&R, 5/4/64,13)
May 4-7: Tenth annual meeting of American Astronautical Society held in New York. Honored by AAS were: Maj. L. Gordon Cooper (USAF), the AAS Flight Achievement Award; Dr. Hubertus O. Strughold, the Mel-bourne W. Boynton Award; Col. Charles Yeager (USAF), the Victor A. Prather Award. (Av. Wk., 5/18/64, 21)
At AAS meeting in New York, Dr. Thomas Gold, Cornell Univ. Director of the Center for Radio Physics and Space Research, said the porous, crush-able material of the lunar surface extended "to a depth of tens of centi-meters or meters," according to radio thermal measurements. "It seems very probable that a few per cent of the lunar surface is hard and rough, probably in the form of many young craters, while the rest is covered with material considerably less dense than solid rock. . [We must be prepared] to find a crushable surface material many meters deep and smoothly deposited, covering most of the moon, and a few per cent of rough hard rock regions covered only with a thin layer of the fluff. . . ." (Av. Wk., 5/18/64, 83)
May 4-7: At same meeting, Dr. Duane O. Muhleman of JPL criticized "fairy castle" theory of lunar surface composition. Dr. Muhleman said the concept was consistent with lunar measurements, but that "a clever man in the laboratory could build other models of surfaces that would be equally, consistent." (M&R, 5/18/64, 23)
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