Jan 29 1965
From The Space Library
AEC said in its Annual Report to Congress that the United States now had four Vela satellites in distant orbits to detect nuclear explosions in space. Two more would be launched this year. U.S. facilities in the Pacific had been brought to a state of instant readiness to resume atmospheric testing should the Soviet Union violate the limited nuclear test ban treaty. (AEC Annual Report, 76-77)
Speaking on the Senate floor, Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) said: "I am greatly disturbed that funds for the continuation of the large solid rocket engine program have been eliminated from the 1966 budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, ". . I am concerned about the effect that the proposed termination of this program will have over our long-range space effort and upon the security of the country. For it will cut off, at a particularly inappropriate time, a crucial research and development program that already has shown significant potential for fulfilling future space booster needs-for both defense and non-defense purposes. This is particularly true for launching large payloads and missions into deep space that are contemplated in the not-so-distant future. "The booster technology and capability that we are developing under the large solid rocket engine program could become a vital factor in preventing the Russians from achieving a position of dominance in space... "Indeed, the decision to terminate this program appears to be a direct contradiction of Mr. Webb's own views, as expressed as recently as Tuesday of this week to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, He said unequivocally that space missions contemplated for the next decade and beyond will require 'new launch vehicles and new space vehicle developments.' He said our experience with the Apollo moon program has shown that 'a policy of support for the development of carefully selected advanced propulsion systems must be followed if we are to assure they will be available when needed.' "It is highly inconsistent-to say the least-to speak boldly of exploring the moon, reaching and charting the planets, establishing manned stations in space, and extending our national strength into the space dimensions, while at the same time killing off one of the most promising programs for the achievement of these very goals. . . ." (CR, 1/29/65, 1535)
NASA approved a contract with the McDonnell Aircraft Corp. converting the $712-million Gemini spacecraft contract from a cost-plus-fixed-fee to a cost-plus-incentive-fee. This was the largest incentive contract that NASA had negotiated; it provided profit incentives for outstanding performance, control of costs, and timely delivery as well as potential profit reductions when performance, cost, and schedule requirements were not met. (NASA Release 65-26)
The National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, established by law in 1964 to find out what technological change was doing to the economic and social fabric of the country and how to obtain its maximum benefits with the least possible harm, met for the first time with Vice President Hubert Humphrey. The Commission would meet again Feb, 18-19 to determine the areas to be explored intensively and possibly to select outside personnel to help with basic research in these studies. (NYT, 1/30/65, 6)
C-14A was certified as a commercial cargo jet. FAA Administrator, Najeeb E. Halaby, said the Lockheed fanjet could "help give civil freight transportation the kind of mobility that brings success to the armed forces." The plane could operate at 550 mph, and needed only a 6,000-ft. runway. The certification climaxed an unusual program in which the FAA, USAF, and industry had jointly developed, produced, and tested the new craft. (AP, NYT, 1/31/65, 27)
U.S. Army formally accepted the first two XV-5A V/Stol (Vertical/ Short Take-Off and Landing) lift-fan research aircraft at Edwards AFB where they were being readied for a six-month Army flight evaluation. Test pilots from NASA, USAF, USN, and the FAA would assist in the evaluation. (DOD Release 59-65)
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