Sep 3 2003

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NASA announced the appointment of John M. Grunsfeld to succeed Shannon W. Lucid as NASA's Chief Scientist, effective immediately. NASA tasked Grunsfeld with ensuring the scientific merit of NASA's programs. Grunsfeld, an astronomer, astrophysicist, and veteran astronaut, had been an integral member of two Space Shuttle-servicing missions to the HST. Lucid had served as Chief Scientist since February 2002. NASA's Administrator Sean O’Keefe had asked her to return to NASA's JSC in Houston, Texas, to help with return-to-flight efforts. During her tenure as Chief Scientist, Lucid had updated NASA science policy, a project that NASA had not undertaken since 1996. One of her most important tasks had been working with the Offices of Biological and Physical Research, Earth Science, Space Science, and Space Flight to develop a comprehensive plan for prioritizing research projects on board the ISS. (NASA, “Astronaut John M. Grunsfeld Succeeds Shannon Lucid as NASA Chief Scientist,” news release 03-280, 3 September 2003, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/sep/HQ_03280_Grunsfeld.html (accessed 28 January 2009).

CAIB Chairperson Harold W. Gehman Jr. and NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe appeared before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation to discuss NASA's return-to-flight goals in light of the CAIB's findings. Committee members criticized the CAIB for its reluctance to assign individual blame within NASA for the Columbia disaster, but Gehman replied that the Board did not need to make judgments about individual accountability. O'Keefe added that NASA would have held individuals accountable only if someone had acted maliciously in the sequence of events that led to the loss of Columbia. O'Keefe also pointed out that all former members of the Shuttle team had either left their positions, or NASA had reassigned them. Gehman testified that the decisions and conditions that had led to the loss of the orbiter had begun years before, stating that Congress and the White House shared responsibility with NASA for creating the conditions responsible for the accident. Congress and the White House had reduced NASA's budget by 40 percent over the previous decade, affecting the operation of NASA's management system. When committee members asked whether NASA required additional funding for 2004, O'Keefe responded that the current budget did not cover some of the CAIB's recommended activities, such as establishing an independent authority to oversee Space Shuttle technical requirements, recertifying the orbiters, and accelerating the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) program. Committee members asked for O'Keefe's assurance that NASA would change its culture, implementing processes that would prevent future Shuttle accidents. (Paul Recer for Associated Press, “Senators Rip NASA over Columbia Probe,” 4 September 2003; Brian Berger, “Lawmakers Press O'Keefe for Cost Figures,” Space News, 4 September 2003.

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