The Empire Strikes Out - Canada's Defence & The Commonwealth Space Program - Part 9 by Robert Godwin
From The Space Library
One of the options being considered for the bus for Canada's proposed radar satellite was the British heavy geostationary platform L-Sat. SPAR Aerospace in Toronto, where Phil Lapp had been a director, had an agreement with British Aerospace to solicit orders for L-Sat in Canada.
Radarsat had originally been called Sursat (Surveillance Satellite) but the name had been changed out of concerns that it might upset the United States.79 The primary goal of the proposed satellite was to eliminate the need for thousands of costly aircraft flights required to monitor traffic through Canadian Arctic waters. Clearly both the intent and the execution were primarily motivated by military concerns. But both Lapp and Geoffrey Pardoe's companies could see benefits to sharing the costs and rewards with Britain since the satellite's orbit would cover vast swathes of territory also of interest to British oil and gas companies.
After considerable effort and some salesmanship it looked like Britain would shoulder several hundred million dollars of the cost but would also reap the benefits to the tune of a $197M contract and at least a thousand jobs. Data processing, sales and other tracking responsibilities would also provide rewards. Other contestants in the field to supply the bus were Rockwell, RCA, Lockheed, General Electronics and Matra.
In April 1988 Britain's Thatcher government officially pulled out from Radarsat while in the midst of a spat with the rest of Europe regarding future space expenditures. Instead Britain would consider funding the proposed International Space Station project.79
At least one reporter snidely remarked, "No atlas, not even [Margaret Thatcher]'s rubber-boundaried volume, will ever place Canada in Europe."81
The collapse of another potentially fruitful British/Canadian alliance had been snapped away, once again, mostly for financial reasons. This proved the concerns that stretched all the way back to MacMillan's day—that Britain simply couldn't afford to "go it alone."
No one will ever know if, with Canada as a partner, Blue Streak could have become a competitive alternative to the multitude of missiles available elsewhere. The natural alliance between the RPE in England and CARDE in Canada would never truly live up to its potential.
In December 1962 Lionel Dickinson, the genius British chemist who had come from RPE and created Cardeplex in Valcartier became another of the many scientists lured south. He moved to California and took a position at the Stanford Research Institute. He then spent the rest of his career working for the Explosive Ordnance Department of the U.S. Navy in Maryland. Black Brant's original purpose was hastily and quietly shelved. The highly efficient and inexpensive rocket which his fuel had made possible would, at the hands of Albert Fia and Bristol Aerospace Canada, go on to become Canada's largest space investment in the early 1960s rapidly evolving into a superb scientific instrument.82 Blue Streak briefly had its moment in the sun as the Europa launcher before being relegated to museum piece.
Both Blue Streak and Black Brant had military roots but the inconvenience of politics turned them into space research systems. Of the two, Black Brant proved to be the survivor. But even without Blue Streak Woomera in Australia would go on to become a world-class space research and launching centre, with thousands of rockets launched.
The Bomarcs would remain part of Canada's defence until 1972 despite evidence that the Soviet Union could jam their guidance.83 Diefenbaker's successor, Lester Pearson, armed them with nuclear warheads.
Today the remnants of Avro Canada, after merging with De Havilland Canada, are deeply embedded in the DNA of Bombardier Aerospace. In 1976 the Canadian government purchased Canadair for $38M from General Dynamics in an attempt to "rationalize the aerospace industry."84
On the 18th August 1986 after accruing massive losses the government sold it to Bombardier for $120M. Allowing for inflation, Bombardier (2013) outsells Avro (1958) by almost ten to one and employs 37,000 people: but A.V. Roe Canada was a conglomerate of over 40 companies many of which were in the business of processing raw materials. If the revenues and employment figures for De Havilland and Canadair are added it makes any true comparison impossible. The evidence seems to suggest that the consolidation was not good for Canada but probably inevitable. Canada's space program evolved almost exactly as Lapp had foreseen back in 1959, as an adjunct providing technical support and services, but primarily to the United States and Europe and not specifically to the Commonwealth.
Perhaps the greatest loss to Canada in 1959 was the imagination of the Avro team and the R&D they pursued, but the subsequent efforts of the 32 recruited by Robert Gilruth contributed to the greatest technological achievement of the 20th century. The benefits they brought to NASA continue to pay dividends in Canada's space program to this day.
Spawned by British industry Canada's aerospace future was now inextricably entwined with that of the United States, in large part because of the Arrow/Bomarc debacle.
In geopolitical terms Britain's role was never the same after the Blue Streak/Skybolt decision. It had acquired a world-class deterrent at the price of losing a space program. De Havilland and Rolls-Royce had both proven that they could build world-class liquid fuel rocket engines and then ultimately they just stopped. The revolutionary engines built for Black Knight were mostly lost to posterity. Britain remains the only country to create its own satellite launch capability and then retire from the field. But without Canada, and certainly without Britain, there could be no Commonwealth space program. However, today British and Canadian engineers produce some of the world's best satellite technology, all launched on rockets built elsewhere. With the British space program completely dissolved away in 1960, the only logical path for a Canadian space program would ultimately go through Washington.
THE END
Footnotes
79Radarsat Study 1982 GTS Ltd
80Montreal Gazette May 10 1988
81Financial Post Apr 22 1988
82The Chapman Report - 1967
83Memo from James Floyd to Avro President JL Plant Nov 7 1958
84Globe and Mail Jan 6 1976
