Apr 17 1978

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NASA announced it had accepted the review board's final report on failure of the Delta launch vehicle carrying ESA's orbital test satellite OTS-A that exploded after liftoff from Cape Canaveral Sept. 13, 1977. The review board had concluded that the failure resulted from a defect in the propellant of the solid-fuel strap-on Castor IV motor No. 1: either incomplete mixing and curing of propellant ingredients, or introduction of a contaminant, most likely water.

The board's findings had led to changing the design of the Castor IV solid-fuel rocket motor by putting additional insulation between the propellant and motor case to protect against such defects. NASA had also revised procedures for mixing and curing the propellant, and had improved the contractor and government test, inspection, and manufacturing surveillance procedures. New Castor IV motors incorporating the corrective actions had been manufactured and requalified. A second orbital test satellite, OTS-B, to replace OTS-A had been scheduled for launch May 4 from Cape Canaveral. (NASA Release 78-61)

NASA had been considering FY81 and 82 missions to send a probe toward Halley’s Comet and land it on Tempel 2 comet, and one that would return a sample of Martian soil to earth, Av Wk, reported. Return of a Mars sample-to be studied first aboard the Space Shuttle in earth orbit-had become the key mission sought by scientists planning Mars strategy for NASA, who viewed a sample mission as a direct follow-on to the Viking mission in progress. NASA would have to make its decisions this summer on specific missions for FY82.

NASA might request the comet mission for FY81, in view of the determination by NASA planners and scientists to send a spacecraft near Halley’s Comet, even though a plan to rendezvous with the comet had disappeared when NASA was unable to obtain a Halley mission in FY79. The Halley/Tempel 2 comet mission would consist of a 1985 Space Shuttle launch of a vehicle using solar-electric propulsion to encounter Halley’s Comet in Nov. 1985 about 93 million mi from earth, eject a probe that would dive into the head or nucleus area of the comet, and return atmospheric data. The mother spacecraft would continue a high-speed flyby of the comet, either passing through the comet's tail or flying a safer trajectory in front of it. (Av Wk, Apr 17/78, 14)

NASA had under consideration for FY83 a supersonic-technology demonstrator, Av Wk reported: an arrow-wing design in the 75 000-lb class suggested by a Boeing concept, although the company was not pursuing development of the vehicle. Boeing had proposed building such an aircraft to obtain cost information and to validate aerodynamics and manufacturing concepts for other U.S. aircraft manufacturers thinking of building operational supersonic transports. If NASA decided to pursue the project with DOD, agencies would probably seek participation by Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and Boeing. (Av Wk, Apr 17/78, 31)

NASA had cancelled the Lockheed/JPL SEASAT ocean-research spacecraft launch planned for May 17, Av Wk reported, because of a failure in its synthetic-aperture radar downlink transmitter. Lockheed had detected the failure during thermal-vacuum testing of the spacecraft. Launch would be postponed until early June; the postponement would delay launch of the RCA/Goddard Tiros-N weather satellite to early Aug., because both missions would go on General Dynamics's Atlas boosters that must use the same pad at Vandenberg AFB. Analysis of the SEASAT failure had revealed damage to a ceramic circuit board during manufacture; all other SEASAT systems functioned normally in the test. (Av Wk, Apr 17/78, 27)

Av Wk reported that the Soviet Union had labeled the U.S. Space Shuttle a killer-satellite development, and U.S. officials planning talks with the USSR had been debating how to refer to the Space Shuttle in these discussions. NASA had been concerned about the effect on the Space Shuttle program of antisatellite negotiations, although U.S. negotiators had stated they had no intention of trading away Space Shuttle capability for USSR concessions. Informal negotiations on limitation of antisatellite-weapons tests had been et for May; U.S. officials said that NASA must have expected the Space Shuttle to be part of antisatellite discussions. As the Soviets had not cited the Space Shuttle by name, but rather as a "manned system of dual use," U.S. officials had not decided whether the concessions sought by the USSR would be on overall Shuttle capability, on individual Shuttle capabilities, or on individual potentially antisatellite Shuttle missions. (Av Wk, Apr 17/78, 17)

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