Feb 25 1985

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The European Space Agency (ESA) issued a review of some material and life sciences experiments aboard the first Spacelab mission November 28 to December 8, 1983.

Of the 33 materials sciences experiments, two were not performed due to hardware malfunctioning, and several experiments did not obtain the full set of experimental runs/operations. The advantage of the microgravity environment for materials processing and fluid physics was the practical absence of thermal (gravity-driven) convention, sedimentation, and hydrostatic pressure. In the microgravity environment, secondary-disturbing factors such as surface tension, capillary forces, and intermolecular forces became dominant.

Some materials sciences experiments focused on protein crystallization, including growth of insoluble crystals by precipitation reaction, nucleation and growth experiments in vapor crystal growth, thermomigration (soret diffusion) of cobalt in liquid tin, floating-zone growth of silicon, investigation of free convection and capillary surfaces in low gravity, and eutectic solidification and formation of fault structures in fibrous and lamellar eutectics.

The Spacelab mission carried nine European life sciences experiments. One investigated functioning in zero gravity of the human vestibular system, an acceleration-sensing system in the inner ear. Others were a mass-discrimination experiment aimed at comparing perception of mass under microgravity conditions and of weight on earth, an experiment aimed at understanding fluid-regulation mechanisms in the low-pressure system of the human body, and observations of the proliferation of lymphocytes during weightlessness. (ESA release Feb 25/85)

NASA Administrator James Beggs criticized the Air Force and NOAA for plans to launch some satellites aboard surplus Titan II missiles rather than using the Space Shuttle, saying it would cost NASA $500 million, the Washington Post reported. "You know the old syndrome," he said, "if it wasn't invented here [at the Air Force] it can't be all that good . . . I don't like it. It is not good for our short-term future and makes it that much more difficult for us to get on an even footing in the next five years." The controversy had begun with an Air Force decision to refurbish and redevelop obsolete Titan II intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch up to 12 Air Force satellites that NASA had assumed would be flying on the Space Shuttle.

When NOAA heard of the Air Force decision, its acting administrator, Anthony Calio (a former NASA official), had contacted the Air Force about launching over the next seven years three advanced weather satellites, called Metsats, into polar orbit. When questioned, Calio had said the Air Force offered a deal that would save NOAA $90 million-it would cost $100 million to redesign the Metsats to fly on the Space Shuttle and $105 million in launch fees versus an Air Force charge of $115 million for the three Titan II launches, resulting in a net saving of $90 million. "This agency has a budget of $1 billion a year so we're talking about 10% of our annual budget. This is strictly a business deal,' Calio concluded.

Beggs responded that he always assumed the Air Force and NOAA would use the Space Shuttle, although they had not signed a formal agreement. He said he did not believe NOAA would save that much and that the Air Force would bear the refurbishment cost to redevelop the Titan II, estimated by Beggs at $100 million.

"I believe what we're talking here is a savings to NOAA and a net loss to the U.S. Treasury," Beggs said. "I think this whole scheme should be looked at very carefully by the administration and by Congress." And he mentioned his concern that the Air Force plan could set a dangerous precedent. (W Post, Feb 25/85, Al)

Supersonic Transport Lewis Research Center (LeRC) researchers believed their engine research, focusing on development of supersonic combustion ramjet (scram- jet) technology, would lead to air-breathing engines capable of operating at speeds through Mach 12, Aviation Week reported. Testing had already produced net thrust-to-drag ratios of better than one at high Mach numbers. Research included solution of engine aerodynamics, diagnostics and measurement problems, and effects of change to full-scale, flight-weight engine prototypes.

Although the Reagan Administration budget request for NASA FY 86 hypersonic research continued the existing level of effort, NASA believed propulsion technology development would be the pacing factor for hypersonic-flight capability and looked to congressional interest, evidenced by a request for a NASA report on hypersonic research, for increased funding.

Initial scramjet technology applications might lie in missile development. As the potential for higher speeds and longer ranges became attainable, NASA concentrated on basic research for later generations of military cruise missiles rather than applications to aircraft. (Av Wk, Feb 25/85, 52)

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