German Rocket Society - Verein für Raumschiffahrt by Frank H. Winter - Part 8

From The Space Library

Contents 1 Project Magdeburg 1.1 Post-Project Magdeburg Vfr Experiments 2 The End Of The Vfr 2.1 Message By Von Dickhuth-Harrach 2.2 Additional Causes Of The Fall Of The Vfr And The Immediate Aftermath 2.3 The Evfv, As The Successor To The Vfr

Project Magdeburg

As head of the Raketenflugplatz, Nebel received many visitors and inquiries. In August 1932, he received Franz Mengering, a consulting mechanical and electrical engineer from the city of Magdeburg. Mengering was also a supporter of the pseudo-scientific “Hollow Earth” theory the roots of which went back to ancient times, although was especially championed in Germany by the 1930s as the “Hohlweltlehre,” or “Hollow Earth Doctrine,” proclaimed by Peter Bender, a German World War I aviator. The basic theory held that planet Earth is not a sphere floating in space, but a hollow bubble, with everything, even other planets and stars, existing on the inside. Mengering's idea was to “test” the theory by means of a rocket. If the rocket was sent “up” and crashed into the antipodes, or opposite end of the globe, this would “prove” the theory.^[1]

Mengering thus proposed a manned rocket flight, with Nebel's help. Nebel himself claimed he never espoused the theory but showed an interest in the manned rocket flight. With this encouragement, Mengering approached city officials of Magdeburg (which was easy enough for him since he had connections with the District Court of Magdeburg.) These officials, says Ley, similarly did not believe in the theory but were definitely “interested in a spectacular rocket ascent, a man-carrying rocket, if possible.” Mengering then returned to Nebel who agreed to the ascent and set the date for 11 June 1933, a Sunday after Easter and an official holiday, “Aviation Day” or air show, in Magdeburg. The launch was to be made from the Magdeburg airport. The two also agreed that the rocket would cost 25,000 RM, plus an additional 15,000 RM since this was to be a city-wide holiday event. A contract was signed in December 1932 between the city and Nebel. Later, Mengering did not get all the pledges he sought, only part of it. Ley believed it was 15,000 RM.

From a rare report of the proceedings of the VfR's General Meeting of 24 September 1932 (just a few days after Mengering had visited), sent by Ley to Pendray, other details of the Magdeburg project are revealed. At the end of the meeting, Ley reported, Nebel, in his present capacity as Treasurer (for the Inland 'Home' Department and the Raketenflugplatz), “spoke about the next plans of the VfR.” “Because the VfR wants to do scientific work,” he began, “it needs money. But nobody is so much interested to spend even smaller sums only for this purpose; they all want to see sensational rocket shots.”

Then Nebel contradicted himself. As summed up by Ley, “The Board agreed under these circumstances to do at once a real show - work and build the first manned rocket (with)...liquid propellants.” Thus, even though Nebel, Riedel, (Ley), and von Braun (who may have been present at this important meeting) “all emphatically rejected the (Hollow Earth) theory,” according to Neufeld, Nebel still had his way and the project continued. (For this reason, we cannot label the Project Magdeburg experiments as “unofficial VfR experiments.” In fact, in his 1937 article “The Dawn of the Conquest of Space,” Ley considered the Magdeburg series as VfR “demonstration” rockets.) “After finishing some necessary (preliminary) work,” concludes Ley's report, “Engineer Riedel will begin with the construction in the winter of (1932-1933).”^[2]

According to VfR regular Herbert Schaefer, who became very much involved with working on the hardware, the man-carrying rocket was now named the “Pilot Rocket” and was to stand 25 ft. (7.6 m) high and propelled by a motor of the then, unheard of thrust of 600 kg (1,322 lb.). The rocket was to ascend to one km (0.6 mi) at which point the pilot was to eject, thereby allowing the rocket itself to continue to fly toward the antipode; in this sense, this individual would not really be a “pilot” (i.e. to fully control the vehicle.)

Before reaching this level of technology, a smaller, unmanned prototype rocket 15 ft. (4.5 m) long of the same shape was to be built and powered by a motor of 200 kg (440 lb.) thrust that would have been the most powerful motor the Raketenflugplatz crew ever built by itself. As remembered by Schaefer, the Raketenflugplatz people who agreed to participate in this project “began to work feverishly,” since “it would be impossible to get such rockets ready in time...But it meant an opportunity to build large rockets without being handicapped by lack of funds. The actual work began around Christmas 1932.”^[3]

“Motors,” Schaefer continued, of 440 lb. (200 kg) were designed and built, and also a new test stand...to 'take' 1,000 kg (2,200 lb.) rockets. That stand was ready in March 1933, but one of the new motors was ready earlier and was tested on a provision stand on 9 March. It could be heard for miles. The big stand actually worked for the first time on 22 March.” In fact, the preparations and testing toward the “Pilot Rocket” were now very well covered in the VfR (or rather, Nebel's Raketenflugplatz) and other literature, mainly because of the enormity and “exotic” novelty of the project - especially since manned rocket flight was involved - and offered tremendous publicity for the Raketenflugplatz as vigorously promoted by Nebel.

Detailed and lengthy accounts of what also became known as “Project Magdeburg” are thus found in the works by Ley, Winter, Sänger-Bredt and Engel, and Jelnina and Rohrwild, et. al., plus a short though useful account from von Braun's perspective at the time; besides these, the German author Frank E. Reitz wrote a book dedicated to the project, Die Magdeburger Pilotenrakete: 1933, Auf dem weg zur Bemannten Raumfahrt? (The Magdeburg Pilot Rocket: 1933, On the Way to Manned Space Flight?) 1998). Therefore, only highlights are summarized here. There is also Nebel's own account in his Die Narren von Tegel besides items like the issue of Raketenflug – Mitteilungen des Raketenflugplatzes Berlin, Nr. 8, of April 1933, produced by Nebel, that is entirely devoted to the project.^[4]

Ley's summation of the 24 September 1932 VfR General Meeting, including mention of the planned manned rocket launch did not appear in the journal of the American Interplanetary Society. Instead, there was only a much later brief mention in the Society's new journal, Astronautics, for December-January 1933. “Herr Heinrich (sic.) Nebel,” says the report, “has announced plans for the construction of a rocket to carry a pilot. The funds are assured by the City (sic.) and Bank of Magdeburg...The cost will be $ 4,000...An acceleration rate of 100 ft./sec (30 m/sec.) (approximately three gravities) is planned and the exhaust is in the form of adjustable nozzles with which Herr Nebel hopes to regulate the velocity of ascent.” The rocket, it is added, “is to be of aluminum, and fuel to be alcohol and liquid oxygen.” A very similar report appeared as an Associated Press newspaper story in The New York Times on 18 December 1932, probably the original date of this release sent to several leading newspapers.^[5]

It turned out that the motor for the smaller prototype Project Magdeburg rocket, identified by Jelnina and Rohrwild as the 1.7/200 model was one (but not the first) of the alcohol/LOX and regeneratively-cooled motors built and tested at the Raketenflugplatz.

Designed by Hans Hüter and others and built of Pantal/Duralumin, the 1.7/200 stood 44 cm (17.3 in) tall, weighed 3.5 kg (7.7 lb.) and produced 150-200 kg (330-440 lb.) of thrust for 20-25 sec. As indicated by its designation, it burned (consumed) 1.7 kg of fuel per second. The motor's technical development began in December 1932 and eight examples were built.

The first test was made on 9 March 1933 on the Portable Test Stand. Hüter is also given credit by Jelnina and Rhorwild for designing the stand that was four m (13 ft.) long and made use of a dynamometer, provided by the Magdeburger Firma Schäfer und Büdenberg, for measuring the thrust. Then, during March 1933, a moveable corrugated shed or “hangar” (i.e. ingeniously set on wheels that rolled over a small track) was built over this stand to protect it from the elements and was completed by 3 April. Altogether, some 20 tests were conducted from 25 March to 1 June on the completed stand, most of them successful although there had been explosions during the first two tests. (These tests are tabulated by Jelnina and Rohrwild.).^[6]

The contemplated larger rocket motor was probably the one designated the 5.1/600 model, briefly mentioned by Jelena and Rohrwild, designed to consume approximately 5.1 kg (11.2 lb.) of fuel per second and deliver a thrust of 600 kg (1,322 lb.) for 40 seconds, according to an existing draft by Herbert Schaefer dated 7 March 1933. However, this was never built simply because the Raketenflugplatz team ran out of time. According to Schaefer, after the overall tests of the smaller prototype (1.7/200) motor showed that it was “reliable” it was already early June and “The City (sic.) of Magdeburg hurried us up.” It was thus agreed to let a rocket with this motor be launched “but not the man-carrying (version)” on 9 June (rather than 11 June).”^[7]

Nevertheless, at some point during the testing, 22-year old unemployed Kurt Heinisch who had joined the VfR in October 1929 and became one of the Society’s most active members, was designated as the “pilot” should the manned version go up; in preparation, he “trained” for this possibility, taking at least part of a skydiving course and prepared to acquire a parachute pilot's license. However, in his examination leap, says Günzel, Heinisch sprained his right foot, which somehow was considered a “good omen for day X” (i.e. launch day) in Magdeburg. At the time he was also regarded as a minor celebrity as “the first rocket pilot” and was interviewed by the local (Magdeburg) press and his picture taken accordingly, manned rocket or not. Besides this, Heinisch as well as Hueter, Riedel, and Nebel are credited with designing the rocket now to be flown, while the mechanics Bermüller, Ehmayer, Zoike assisted in making parts for the rocket motors, while Schaefer supervised welding tasks throughout 60-hour weeks.

Another individual also helped in the project, Arnold Gerlach, who was a friend of Zoike. (Ley, incidentally, later wrote: “The over-enthusiastic publicity department in Magdeburg (he does not specify for which organization), unaware of the technical difficulties that arose in Berlin and which meant a long postponement, had issued a souvenir postcard with an artist's conception of the flight and the inscription, "The first manned rocket flight of the Magdeburg Pilot Rocket: Sunday after Pentecost, 1933.")^[8]

The unmanned rocket now quickly built to make the ascent stood 280 cm (110 in, or 9 ft.) tall with a maximum diameter of 75 cm (29.5 in.). The other data are as follows: motor weighed 3.5 kg (7.7 lb.); tank, structural elements and valves, 60 kg (132 lb.); and the dry (unfueled) weight, 70 kg (154 lb.). It now carried no payload. The average thrust was now calculated at 250 kg (550 lb.) for 32.5 sec. The calculated exhaust velocity was 805 m/sec (2,640 ft./sec). Since Sänger and Engel refer to this rocket as the “10-liter (2.6 gallon) Magdeburger Startgerät” (“Magdeburg Start Unit”), or 10-L rocket, it may be assumed they were referring to the propellant quantity, or perhaps just the fuel.

The propellants were now the more usual gasoline and LOX, along with standard cooling utilizing forced fuel flow and excess oxygen. Prior to lift-off the propellant-feed system was pressurized by nitrogen for the fuel and by self-evaporation for the LOX. In the first attempted launches, the rocket had no shroud, but in later launch attempts there was a shroud. ^[9]

As may be expected, the local (Magdeburg) press coverage for all the attempted launches was extensive, but the most detailed and factual report was be found some months later in an article by an anonymous author in the Berlin journal Technik voran! Zeitschrift des Reichsbundes Deutscher Technik E.V. (Technology Advance! Journal of the Reich Association of German Technology, Registered Society) for 5 November 1933. On the front of this issue of the journal is a photo of two men preparing one of the rockets for its launch. Since the article is titled “Rocket Flight - Report from (the) Raketenflugplatz Reinickendorf” and contains a series of photos that were only obtainable at the time directly from the Raketenflugplatz, and since an identical although still anonymous article, even down to the photos and captions, appears in the later May 1934 issue of Raketenflug - Mitteilungen des Raketenflugplatzes Berlin that was produced entirely by Nebel, there are two possibilities: (1), Nebel himself was the author; and (2), another individual of the Raketenflugplatz who was intimately familiar with Project Magdeburg, wrote it with the authorization of Nebel. Regardless of either possibility, we may attribute the article to Nebel.

Altogether, there were ten launch attempts according to Sänger and Engel, while Jelena and Rhorwild record a total of 15 that appears to be a more accurate number that takes into account as many as nine starting failures, although unaccountably leaves out the very first attempt on 8 June so there may have been 16 attempts overall. (Rietz says the “Nebel team set out on 7 June to Magdeburg” and that the first start was early in the morning on 8 June, according to the diary of Schaefer.) Schaefer, in his more general account, given by Ley, only starts with the attempt on 9 June.) The first attempts were on the Mose estate near Magdeburg, also given as a “large lawn” close to the manor of the Amtsrat (Magdeburg city Board member) Druckenbrodt at Gut Mose, or “near Wolmirstedt.” The Mose location is also described as a “cow pasture.” The papers and available photos show that many people came.^[10]

Here, we summarize the first-hand account from Technik voran! (i.e. most likely Nebel). The transportation, it begins, was “especially difficult due to the limited funds we had,” and although “the material was carefully packaged, damages happened unfortunately....Numerous prominent personalities from Magdeburg and Berlin showed up on 8 June at the launch site.” The fuel loading took longer than normal, and ignition took place at 5:45 a.m., but the thrust was insufficient according to the scale and no launch could be made. (“For this kind of circumstance,” it is noted, “a device was installed to hold back the rocket in its launcher.”) Heavy rainfall hampered other attempts and even caused warping to the wooden launch rack. But new LOX was brought from Berlin, damages were repaired, although on the attempt of 11 June the oxygen valve broke down. Another valve failed on the 13th when the rocket had climbed to only six ft. (1.8 m) in the launcher, then it fell back down. Finally, on the 29th, the rocket cleared the rack, but it tipped over at 30 m (98 ft.), then crashed with the motor still burning.^[11]

Writing years later in his Rockets, Missiles, Ley quite rightly indicated that for all intents and purposes, the Magdeburg project ended at this point (i.e. with the attempt of 29 June 1933 in the vicinity of Magdeburg.) Thus, technically-speaking, the next series of experiments after this may be categorized as the “Post-Magdeburg Experiments.” They were also the final ones conducted by the VfR.

Post-Project Magdeburg Vfr Experiments

Despite all the abysmal failures and setbacks in Project Magdeburg, Nebel sought to continue the experiments. “Although not everything went to plan,” it is stated in the Technik voran! article, “the visitors got the assurance that it would be possible to witness launches of larger rockets with more development.” Furthermore, the article continues, “The experiences from these launch attempts showed that it was...not desirable to receive significant (technical) support from a base and its machine shops far away (from the launch site). The next task was now to find a new launch site within the proximity of 30 km (about 18 miles) from the base.” The experimenters (led by Nebel) therefore cast about for a new launch site but, “The selection was very limited, either because the owners did not grant approval, or officials issued insuperable difficulties.” “Promisingly,” the account continues, they found two islands in the Tegeler Lake, near Berlin, “and we came to an agreement with the lease holder, Mr. Pieper, of the Lindwerder island, also known as 'Lover's Island.' We were able to get the approval from the 'water police' so we transported all the (rocket) material and (launch) devices on a motor boat to the island on the night of 14 July 1933.”

By this time, “The rocket was entirely modified, in particular the tanks (that) were set very closely to the motor (and) new valves were made, and the old 12 m (40 ft.) launcher was replaced by a 11.5 m (37.7 ft) device.” Actually, there were now four tanks placed together and Jelnina and Rohrwild thus identify this configuration as the “Four Stick Rocket”. Standing 250 cm (98 in., or 8.2 ft) and about 75 cm (about 30 in.) in width, this bullet-shaped four-leg version of the rocket had fairings and fins.^[12]

The launch was made at 5:45 (a.m.), although there is some confusion here and this may mean the flight was on the following morning after their arrival, or on 15 July. There is further confusion as Reitz says they arrived on the 14th but “a further test the next day did not work out due to a broken ignition line. Finally, the launch took place at 5:45 (a.m.) on...14 July,” so it may have been on the 16th. In any case, “...the rocket soared 700 m (2,296 ft) (Reitz gives this figure while Sänger and Engel say 600 m, or 1,968 ft, but Jelena and Rohrwild round it off to 3,000 ft, 914 m). The Technik voran! account (by Nebel) then says the rocket made “three loops with a radius of 30 m (about 98 ft). Shortly before touching the lake's surface, parachutes were deployed. An investigation showed that an oxygen valve did not open which resulted in an increasing side movement. This was without doubt a nice contribution to a chapter on (the) 'Guidance of liquid (Propellant) rockets.'” Yet a similar event of the rocket veering when a fuel valve did not open happened in a flight of 21 July when the rocket went up 100 m (about 328 ft), although the rocket was recovered without much damage.^[13]

Schaefer says after this, the “captain who owned 'Lover's Island' objected” to the launches, because “we scared his summer campers.” But the Technik voran! account (again, Nebel) does not mention this and merely says the “lease owner did not allow more launches and we were once again in search for a new launch site. After a period, we were granted permission to perform launches from the Schwielosee, a lake close to Potsdam. This lake did not have an island so we had to do the launches from a boat.”

The vessel turned out to be the Kamerad (Comrade), made available from the naval branch of the Stahlhelm (“Steel Helmet”), a paramilitary nationalist organization established at the end of 1918 but in the latter days of the Weimar Republic it operated as an armed branch of the DNVP, the German National People's Party. However, the boat modifications delayed the next launch until 4 August although due to other complications the new launch occurred on 11 August. Again, there were valve malfunctions and the rocket “reached only an altitude of 80 m (about 260 ft) and crashed into a deep section of the lake and was not found again...” despite a diving operation by the firm of Drägerwerke, probably Drägerwerke AG & Co. of Lubeck.^[14]

A new rocket was therefore assembled, now a 400 cm (157 in, or 13 ft) tall “two-stick” version with very long tanks, a 200 kg (440 lb.) thrust motor and with fairing but without fins. It was launched on 1 September from the same location but only reached 30 m (about 98 ft) and “dove into the lake, (then) resurfaced again...” The final two launches were made on 9 and 18 September. For these efforts, since the “dependence of a foreign (sic.) launch boat was felt unpleasant, even more so because it was combined with high transportation costs,” the account continues, the Nebel team were compelled to build their own “launch float,” or raft fashioned of eight lashed gasoline barrels. But in the attempt on the 9th, “a line broke during the ignition and destroyed the parachute.” Strangely, the Technik voran! (Nebel's article) says nothing about the final attempt on 18 September - and probably the Society's last; Schaefer merely says both the final attempts were “poor.”^[15]

“Three years from the beginning of the Raketenflugplatz, from 27 September 1933 (sic., 27 September 1930 was meant), are behind us now,” concludes the (Nebel) article in Technik voran! “...Even more difficult work is ahead of us,” it continues. “Rocket flight is now where aviation was at the turn of the century...yet we had to start with something completely new, the rocket engine...rocket flight has to be further developed. It should be the primary national task of science and technology...We cannot believe that during the Third Reich (i.e. the Hitler regime that had begun on 30 January 1933 with the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany) the same lack of comprehension for new inventions will be, as it happened during the last decades.” (Yet despite the generally overall thoroughness of the (Nebel) Technik voran! coverage of what had happened on the technical side of Project Magdeburg, what it had utterly failed to report was that all the experiments up to June 1933 were all in support of an absurd pseudo-scientific theory.)^[16]

The End Of The Vfr

Despite the over-blown and meaningless conclusion of the Technik voran! article (again, by Nebel), there is no question Project Magdeburg had been an utter disaster from start to finish, or rather, a series of disasters. Besides this, the affair was a huge embarrassment to the Society's more level-headed and serious members like Ley, as well as VfR President von Dickhuth-Harrach. (But in part two of his article, “The End of the Rocket Society,” Ley relates that he and von Dickhuth-Harrach had been discouraged with Nebel even before Project Magdeburg, especially after they had gone over the Society's ledgers and found awful discrepancies, although their efforts to take Nebel to court had failed, that “Consequently von Dickuth and I resigned as directors, but stayed members of the VfR - a VfR that existed only on paper.” However, as seen below, there is some question as to when von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley resigned than is alleged here. Their resignations actually appear to have been made later.)

The motivations of Riedel for very closely aligning himself with Nebel in Magdeburg and other projects may be largely explained by von Braun in a later statement he conveyed to Ley. While both he (von Braun) and Riedel “...had always considered (Nebel) a successful if unscrupulous salesman with little technical and no scientific background...and...a 'dud' in technical matters,” von Braun wrote, “he (Riedel) pointed out that Nebel, through his tireless salesmanship had given him (Riedel) the opportunity to work on liquid-fuel rocket development and thereby to acquire the experience which (later) made him valuable for Peenemünde.” In short, Riedel did recognize Nebel's shortcomings but he remained enormously grateful for the opportunities Nebel afforded him.

On top of this, as Schaefer pointed out, those were extremely difficult years of mass unemployment and economic depression. Schaefer too was most grateful to Nebel, in his case for the opportunity to work on a challenging if precarious engineering project; additional benefits were bachelor quarters and comradeship in a group of like-minded individuals. Moreover, Riedel, Schaefer, and other members very were young and idealistic men and were fully engaged in the forefront of the exciting and new field of experimental rocketry in an organization whose motto was: “Help Build the Spaceship!”

Still another aspect is that as also recalled by von Braun, Riedel believed “private enterprise with space travel as its goal could procure the necessary finances for such a worthy objective.” “Exactly how he proposed to bridge the gap” to see “a huge passenger-carrying spaceship wasn't quite clear to us,” von Braun added.

In any case, as seen above, at the start of the Raketenflugplatz phase of the history of the VfR, in 1930, there had been a sudden shift to a sole fixation upon: (1), creating basic, workable liquid-propellant rocket hardware followed quickly by (2), every effort to achieve ever more spectacular (for the time) flight “shows” of these rockets, albeit this was unfortunately not done on a carefully planned systematic basis.

A few years later, in 1937, after living in the U.S. for some time, Ley wrote the article “The Dawn of the Conquest of Space” in which he briefly summarized all the VfR's experimentation at the Raketenflugplatz from August 1929 until June 1933. (Interestingly, he also uses the term “the German Rocket Society,” yet the organization does not seem to have been called that during its experimental years - and never by that name in Germany.) Nonetheless, Ley explained that: “...we built: four proving stands, one for the Miraks - the first type of liquid-fuel rockets we built - one for rocket motors alone. This was the second or large proving stand; it served for most of the ground tests. Proving Stand No. 3 (sic.) was also only for rocket motors, but portable. It was not often used. Stand No. 4 was for complete rockets of the heaviest type.”

“About 490 ground tests were made on these four proving stands,” he continues, “and about 95 rocket flights. To these flights, six flights of an especially heavy type of rockets, built for a demonstration contemplated by the city of Magdeburg, have to be added. These heavy 'Repulsors,' as I have termed them, weighed more than 200 pounds (90 kg). They reached altitudes up to about 2,400 feet (732 m). The lighter Repulsors still hold the record for liquid-fuel rockets (so far as he knew). They ascended about two miles (3.2 km) and covered, once, a distance (range) of three miles (4.8 km). This was highly unwanted, since the proving ground was so near the city. For the same reason, we had to resist all temptations to prepare a real (high) altitude shot.” “Rocketry,” he also speculated, is now about as far as aviation was some 30 years ago (i.e. 1907).” (Again, the accuracy of these figures for the numbers of flights and tests of the VfR is questionable, especially if they had been furnished to Ley by Nebel.)^[17]

Yet despite this proud record of “extensive research,” as Ley phrased it, the Magdeburg affair had inevitably led to a serious schism within the Society between: (a), those who supported a more careful and balanced program of experimentation that could potentially lead to greater technological progress; and (b), those who supported Nebel and his rationale that more spectacular shows could lead to increased funding for more experimentation. Yet, there was a host of far more serious underlying issues than these. For one, there was Nebel's involving the VfR in the support of a patently pseudo-scientific and even quack theory, besides his flagrant misuse of VfR manpower and already meager resources of the Raketenflugplatz, even though von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley had been led to believe that the Magdeburg Project “was to be entrusted to him personally, not to the VfR.”

As we will also see, Nebel's free-wheeling personality, his constant scheming, and wholly unscientific and showmanship approach and poor judgment, further exacerbated an already very complicated situation. Put briefly, in the words of Sänger and Engel, “With the Magdeburg adventure, the people in charge (specifically Nebel) had gone too far!” (sic.) By the same token it may also be argued, as further discussed below, the role of the Army in wishing to maintain absolute secrecy in the pursuit of their own rocket program coupled with the sudden emergence of the totalitarian Nazi regime in January 1933 were also bound to lead to, or play roles in, the collapse of the VfR and its private rocket experimentation.^[18]

We will never know all the details but it is abundantly clear that from an early point in the course of Project Magdeburg, the VfR could not survive the schism. Already in the first month or two of 1933, Ley and Dickhuth-Harrach drew up a memorandum that eventually led to the suspension of Nebel as Secretary (and presumably also Treasurer) of the VfR. Ley felt so strongly about recording for posterity what had happened, that on 21 August 1943 (when he had already been living in the U.S. for almost ten years) he typed up and signed an English translation of the memorandum, now to be found in the Willy Ley papers in the collections of the National Air and Space Museum. We will now summarize this memorandum.

The two-page, single-spaced memorandum is broken down into the categories of: “Organization,” “Liability,” “Scientific Disgrace,” “Matters Concerning the Office of the District Attorney,” and “Really Meritorious.”

Under “Organization” category, von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley found that Nebel had “completely neglected” his secretarial work, including his “neglect to reply to letters from members” and others. “Business ledgers were not kept or kept falsely, with premeditated falsifications. Receipts were not issued. The President was not kept informed (and) often he was deliberately misinformed (by Nebel). Nebel (also) tried, among other things, to make the President sign 'Minutes' of a meeting of the Board of Directors, which were falsified,” and so on.

Under “Liability,” it was noted that “During the first days of the Raketenflugplatz, Nebel filed (a) voluntary petition of bankruptcy of the VfR in order to escape paying a bill of 50 RM” yet the money was available to pay the bill. (This occurred in February 1933, Ley later wrote in his Rockets - The Future of Travel Beyond the Stratosphere.) Moreover, Nebel “did not divulge the fact that he had filed the petition for more than a year.” At another point, he falsely stated that he was the VfR President, as well as other findings of liability.

In the category of “Scientific Disgrace,” von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley cited not only the case of Nebel working with “representatives of the Hollow Earth Theory”(in the name of the VfR), but also with another pseudoscientific cause, the WEL Society that espoused the Welteislehre (World Ice Theory), proposed by the Austrian engineer Hans Hörbiger that held that ice was the basic substance of all cosmic processes, and ice moons, ice planets, and the "global ether" (also made of ice) had determined the entire development of the universe. He also “published three long and factually incorrect articles...”

As to “Matters Concerning the Office of the District Attorney,” Nebel took personal advantage of a huge amount of free gasoline donated to the VfR and privately sold some of it and used the money. In 1930, he had also “forced his way into the German Navigation Exposition at Kiel by promising to demonstrate an ascent of a liquid-fuel rocket...(before) the VfR had made a flight...” It was also noted that the first flight of a VfR rocket had actually been made by Riedel, “without Riedel's knowledge” at the time. In fact, von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley were compelled to add that “Really Meritorious” were “the engineering accomplishments” that “are to be credited mostly to Riedel,” implying that Nebel unjustly attempted to take credit for himself.^[19]

Still more negative findings surfaced. But Ley chose to conceal or downplay much of these troubles in his published reminiscences of the VfR over the years, apart from the fact that 1933 was the worst year he had faced in many respects, including the installation of a “ruthless totalitarian regime” in Germany, as he put it. But he did briefly give one other key event of additional frustration he and von Dickhuth-Harrach had to contend with in handling the problems caused by Nebel. This occurred “in the spring of 1933,” Ley wrote, “(when) we had (VfR) ledgers and correspondence seized and found facts which had to be submitted to the District Attorney.” This was the case regarding Nebel filing the false claim of bankruptcy of the VfR. “To make the story short,” Ley concluded, “nothing happened. The District Attorney, seeing that Nebel wore a swastika armlet, was afraid to act.” (This was the very serious situation that had prompted, as briefly mentioned earlier, as claimed by Ley that both he and von Dickhuth-Harrach resigned from their posts as VfR directors and merely remained as members.)^[20]

Message By Von Dickhuth-Harrach

Yet, von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley did not give up trying to resolve the overall situation although it took several more agonizing months. This is revealed in a remarkable statement by President von Dickhuth-Harrach published in the very last issue of the VfR mimeographed bulletin, now called Raketentechnik (Rocket Technology), for 1 November 1933. (This was also the first, and probably only issue of Raketentechnik. It is also interesting to note that if von Dickhuth-Harrach was still acting as President of the Society, this puts into question Ley's claim that he and von Dickhuth-Harrach had resigned earlier, at least as Board members.)

His message is oddly titled “Clean Economy” (“Saubere Wirtschaft”). The introduction is also odd: “This highest ideal (a “clean economy”) which was unfortunately almost completely lost in German intellectual circles during the years of Marxism,” he began, “has become honorable again, thanks to the will of our Führer, Peoples’ Chancellor Adolf Hitler. Hopefully it will soon be considered in the way it was before the war; that is, each German feels in his flesh and blood that he cannot act anything less than honestly and openly.”

Von Dickhuth-Harrach then went on to say that the worst enemies in this regard were not those who openly supported the (Weimar) Republic’s political and economic initiatives, but rather those who cloaked their own narrow self-interest by acting “decently in speech and emphasizing their usefulness to the community.”

After this, von Dickhuth-Harrach got to the main issue of Nebel. He now explained that when he (von Dickhuth-Harrach himself) had come aboard as the VfR President in December 1931 he found that “Diploma Engineer Nebel was the owner and founder of the Raketenflugplatz” and also the “one hundred percent Plenipotentiary General Manager (i.e. business manager) of the VfR.” That is, Nebel virtually held full control of the Society. “Of course it was impossible to change anything,” von Dickhuth-Harrach continued, “as long as there was nothing to criticize about the business directions. About this subject, however, I developed some concern which became stronger and caused me to suggest during a session in 1932 the separation of the business directions of the VfR from the Raketenflugplatz. I was assured by the leading group before the session of an agreement to this suggestion. However, they left me hanging during the session. Therefore everything remained as it was before. In the spring of 1933, however, the situation had become so serious that I, as the lawful director, could not remain silent about how the business was handled. And since the bylaws (of the VfR) assured me freedom of action without the agreement of the management group (Board of Directors) I have taken the steps already known by the members of the VfR, that I take the business management out of the hands of Nebel and, according to the bylaws (Paragraph 8), take it upon myself. “

“Since then,” he went on, “Nebel not only gave passive resistance against the VfR, but did everything to damage the organization. It would go too far if I would explain the details or touch on other (related) matters. When I, however, learned that Nebel had founded a new society called the “Orgneb” (for 'Nebel Organization') in which he had invested his own funds, while telling me that he would close the Raketenflugplatz, I decided, after careful consideration, in the interest of the VfR and its members, to take certain actions, especially after I was denied a discussion about separation of the funds of the organization from those of the Raketenflugplatz. In considering the practical work (experimentation) and because of pure human considerations, I waited to the last possible moment, but on the other hand, in time to avoid that this matter would hurt (i.e. split) the organization.”

“With regard to the practical work (experimentation),” he further said, “I can briefly say that it was strongly supported by the city of Magdeburg but it remained on a rather low level. A thorough judgment about that (the Project Magdeburg episode) I cannot give yet openly. The tests were terminated because the city of Magdeburg was unhappy about the situation (the failures of the Magdeburg launch attempts) and had stopped financial support. My action touched the Nebel organization at the moment when it just began to plan great actions with regard to gaining funds and starting new work. Under cover I learned that these plans were of no importance.”

Following this, von Dickhuth-Harrach arrived at his conclusion: “According to paragraph 10b of the bylaws(, therefore,) I have now excluded Dipl. Ing. Rudolf Nebel because he continuously acted contrary to the purposes of the Society. About the suspension method, it is of course, not possible for me to say something (at this time); but I will safeguard the interests of the Society as well as I can, and I will report about further actions in the next General Assembly in Berlin (See also page 3 (of the Raketentechnik issue of 1 November 1933). v. Dickhuth-Harrach.” (As for Nebel's attempt to split off from the VfR with his own group, Neufeld merely sums this up and says Nebel's “counter move” in attempting to “register the Raketenflugplatz as a society in its own right” failed.)^[21]

Regarding the strange preamble to the message by von Dickhuth-Harrach, this is explained by Michael B. Peterson in his 2005 University of Maryland doctoral thesis, “Engineering Consent: Peenemünde (sic.), National Socialism, and the V-2 Missile, 1924-1945.” In this work, he devotes a lengthy analytic chapter on the amateur rocketry groups in Germany prior to the founding of Peenemünde in which he focuses on two “groups”: first, the VfR that was a registered organization of hundreds of people, and secondly, the less than a handful of rocket people associated with the Heylandt Company. (Peterson's thesis was afterward much edited and published in 2009 as Missiles for the Fatherland: Peenemünde, National Socialism, and the V-2 Missile.)

Peterson's overall thesis is that previous histories of Peenemünde, as well as groups like the VfR, have overlooked the “social history” or cultures of these entities and that a rabid nationalism and National Socialism (Nazi) politicization dominated their goals and how they operated. As reviewed by Neufeld, Peterson had found, among other things that “These were not apolitical engineers blithely lost in mathematical equations and dreams of space travel, but astute professionals dedicated to destroying Germany's enemies while serving their own careers.”

More is said below on Peterson's interpretation of his theses as applies specifically to the VfR overall. But insofar as von Dickhuth-Harrach's preamble is concerned, he sees this as a prime example of an anti-Weimar Republic (and pro-National Socialist) statement. “...At worst,” he adds,” it was “a politicization of the Society” and alignment of the organization with the National Socialist policy of eliminating the supposed corruption of the Weimar Republic, hence, the euphemistic phrase “Clean Economy.” However, von Dickhuth-Harrach died in the fall of 1946 and it is not known whether he left any papers so Peterson's contention cannot be corroborated; nor can the statement be additionally clarified.^[22]

Additional Causes Of The Fall Of The Vfr And The Immediate Aftermath

A further perusal of the 1 November 1933 issue of Raketentechnik reveals the following item: “Attention: Change! General meeting (of the VfR) in Berlin on Friday, 10 November 1933 in the 'Roten Haus' ('Red House'), Nollendorfplatz (in Berlin). Beginning 20:30 (8:30 p.m.)...By decree of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda meetings are all prohibited until 12.11.1933 (12 November 1933); So on November 17, a week later.”

Thus, the now scheduled “General meeting” for 17 November 1933, must have been the exact date Ley was referring to when he wrote: “During that winter the VfR collapsed during a stormy session, and while I pretended to try to reorganize it under another name, I quietly took the first steps toward leaving (Nazi) Germany.”^[23]

Yet, the end of the VfR was vastly more hidden and complicated than that. It is true Ley also relates the story, which he got from von Braun as follows: “Shortly after the test on the Lake (Lake Schwielow in Berlin, in September 1933, following Project Magdeburg)...Nebel was visited by a representative of the city administration of Reinickendorf, who handed him an enormous water bill - if I remember correctly it was about 1,600 Marks (then, about $ 380, and in 2014, equivalent to about $5,150). Nebel first thought it was all a mistake, but soon it was discovered that a number of leaky faucets in some of the buildings which had never been used had run up this exorbitant water bill, silently during all the time from September 1930 to the summer of 1934. Having always worked on an almost cash-free basis, Nebel couldn't pay. The city boys became unsympathetic and canceled the famous lease; the area had to be cleared by a certain date.”^[24]

Von Braun's memory may have not been entirely correct, however, because if the water bill covered the period up to “the summer of 1934,” this was some nine or ten months after the last test(s) on Lake Schwielow in September 1933, not “shortly after.” To complicate matters, Ordway and Sharpe say that in January 1934 the Raketenflugplatz “rocket range reverted to the use for which it had been established in World War I - a storage area for ammunition,” although the source for their statement is uncertain. Moreover, the very last issue of the Raketenflug Mitteilungen des Raketenflugplatzes Berlin, is Nr. 9 for May 1934, perhaps marking the cessation of all VfR activities. However, from a translation of Schaefer's meticulous shorthand notes, his last visit to the Raketenflugplatz was on 26 September 1934, although the VfR may well have already ended before that time.^[25]

Apart from the above, there is evidence that sometime in 1933, after the installation of the Hitler regime, the Raketenflugplatz had come under the control of the military. However, von Braun, in his May-June 1956 lengthy article, “Reminiscences of German Rocketry” in the Journal of the British Interplanetary Society stated quite emphatically that: “There is not a word of truth in the (then) widely circulated rumor that the Raketenflugplatz sold out to the Nazis.”

Yet Ley relates, in his Rockets, Missiles, that at least for one short period of time, a military organization “who called themselves the Deutsche Luftwache (German Air Guard), came and told us that the place (the Raketenflugplatz) had been assigned to them as a drill ground, making (our) life difficult. On one occasion, I was not permitted to enter, being told by one man with some insignia of rank on his collar tabs that the Gestapo (Secret Police) was there to seize documents and equipment. Possibly a routine investigation took place that day, but if so, I, as vice-president of the VfR, should have been questioned.” Ley does not conclude this story.^[26]

On the other hand, according to Neufeld, “Herbert Raabe, a VfR member and occasional visitor to the Raketenflugplatz remembers being turned away by a soldier guarding the site when he came to visit in the late summer (of 1933) or early fall.” Yet there was another visitor to the Raketenflugplatz during this period. This was the 23-year old Phillip Ellaby Cleator (better known as P.E. Cleator), a British structural engineer living near Liverpool, England, who had recently (on 13 October 1933), formed the British Interplanetary Society. He came in January 1934 and spent two days with Ley although in his later recollections he did not mention guards at the Raketenflugplatz but did remember seeing only “a collection of dilapidated buildings.” Besides Ley, Cleator also met Nebel and “found him polite but uncommunicative, as befitted a knight of the New Order. So I returned to Ley, and we dined pleasantly together, and discussed plans for the future.” There is no indication at all, nor would it have been appropriate, for Ley to relate to Cleator about the terrible situation then embroiling among the leadership of the VfR.^[27]

Ley was more frank about the final days of the VfR, and also about Nebel, in his article “The End of the Rocket Society” and in his earlier book, Rockets - The Future of Travel Beyond the Stratosphere (1944) that became the basis for his later and highly popular Rockets, Missiles, & Space Travel that went through several editions. It is noteworthy that key segments of these earlier accounts simply do not appear in the updated Rockets, Missiles although there are still problems with some of the details.

Notably, in his Rockets - The Future, Ley stated: “Von Dickhuth(-Harrach) removed Nebel from the Board of Directors; later we both resigned. (This certainly entirely contradicts Ley's other account that he and von Dickhuth-Harrach had resigned earlier, even before Magdeburg.) The VfR was dead. Just before it died the Nazis had come to us 'to give us directives'...They were going to reorganize the VfR, but their luck was poor...The New Order then descended upon the Raketenflugplatz...For a while von Dickuth(-Harrach) and I tried to keep the interested VfR members together in another society but it was a slow death. There was no opportunity for doing anything useful, nor any hope for such opportunity. Late in 1934(,) I prepared to leave Germany.” (Schaefer was to follow him in leaving Germany, arriving in New York City and was greeted by Ley on 7 April 1936.)

Ley also includes in this version, a corroborating statement by Shaefer from his shorthand notes: “Nebel had hope that by stringing along with a uniformed organization he could achieve something. All he achieved was that they 'took over'; the sound of marching boots became commonplace on the (Raketenflugplatz) proving grounds...” It therefore seems that in its final days, the military and the Nazi Party took full and permanent control of the VfR and its Raketenflugplatz, rather than a strictly temporary move there by the Deutsche Luftwache as suggested in the version of events in Ley's later Rockets, Missiles. Ley adds in his article “The End of the Rocket Society” that “Finally (he does not give a date although the context suggests by early 1934) the Gestapo seized papers, journals, books, (and) probably the equipment too (of the VfR). The men who had worked on the proving ground (the Raketenflugplatz) were given jobs, mainly in industrial firms like Siemens.”^[28]

But besides von Dickhuth-Harrach's lengthy statement about Nebel's expulsion from the VfR appearing in the Raketentechnik for 1 November 1933 plus the big General meeting of 17 November, additional perusal of this publication reveals other items that convey a curious kind of “normalcy” in VfR affairs. Perhaps this may or may not have been the carefully planned intent by both von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley. A few examples will suffice.

First, there is the piece, “Society Work in the Winter of 1933” that includes several joined notes: “The VfR intends to use the winter months as highly desirable to boost Society work,” it begins, “as the summer months naturally take place (with)...the debate evenings...Also, the present bulletin is to be brought back...(and) Contributions for the 4th quarter of 1933 are now due and we ask that they be paid...the account of the VfR...”

There is also an article on the accidental death on 11 October 1933 of the German engineer and rocket experimenter Reinhold Tiling who had developed and flew types of enormously large solid-propellant (gunpowder) rockets fitted with wings that snapped out, like a pocket knife, at peak altitude and gently caused each of the spent rockets to glide down to safe recovery. Tiling's ultimate purpose for these series of patented rockets was to potentially transport and recover mail. However, Ley and others in the VfR dismissed his rocket flights as yet more “stunts” that did not genuinely advance rocket technology, nor certainly advance the cause of spaceflight.

Tiling had no connection with the VfR, although Nebel had attempted to collaborate with him (for potential profits of his mail rockets that then seemed commercially very promising) and have the VfR provide him with liquid-propellant motors for the rockets in lieu of his powder ones. Tiling had even visited the Raketenflugplatz in early September 1930 for these talks. Then, in the Raketenflug Nr. 2 for March 1932, Nebel ran the article “Powder Rockets – Liquid Propellant Rockets, A Comparison,” that quite rightly demonstrated far superior exhaust velocities of liquid propellants over solids. But the talks with Tiling still led nowhere. Nonetheless, Tiling, his two assistants, Friedrich "Fritz" Kuhr and Angelika Buddenbohmer, were all killed in the accident of 11 October as the result of an explosion at Tiling's workshops near Osnabruck while loading powder.

Another item in the last Raketentechnik for 1 November 1933 was on the “First Liquid-Fuel Rocket (Flight) in (the) USA.” This was not at all accurate since Goddard by now had secretly achieved some nine liquid-propellant rocket flights. In any case, the reported American flight was the first of the American Interplanetary Society and was later identified as American Rocket Society Rocket No. 2, or ARS No. 2, since the Society became known as The American Rocket Society in April 1934. As mentioned, Pendray's American group were now trying to emulate what the VfR had done at the Raketenflugplatz.

Then, the Raketentechnik additionally included a few words on a new book that was just released, Männer der Rakete (Men of the Rocket) by journalist Werner Brügel, with collected essays by leading figures in the field of rocketry of the day, like Winkler, Ley, as well as by von Dickhuth-Harrach. This was a “highly interesting and really quite novel” work, said the announcement. “Please note (the) accompanying prospectus of the publisher. A review of the book takes place soon.” It never did, at least in any VfR publications, and in retrospect, Brügel's anthology was one of the very last books on space flight and rocketry to appear in the days of the “rocket fad” that was now virtually over.^[29]

A few other remarks by Ley from his 1944 Rockets - The Future of Travel are also telling of the less than “normal” and peaceful environment at the Raketenflugplatz that was to grow far worse after the Magdeburg episode. “There were continuous clashes during the meetings of the (VfR) Board of Directors except on two occasions when Nebel was not present,” Ley wrote. “When he was (present) he attacked everything and everybody. He attacked me for having kept an agreement about mutual information which I had signed on the occasion of Pendray's visit to Berlin (in April 1931). He attacked the new president of the VfR, Major Hans-Wolf von Dickhuth-Harrach, a retired officer, for having signed a congratulatory letter to Ziolkovsky (Tsiolkovsky) on the occasion of Ziolkovsky's seventy-fifth birthday (in September 1932).”^[30]

The Evfv, As The Successor To The Vfr

As for the “other' Society that Ley spoke of during or after the collapse of the VfR that was to now replace the latter, this was the oddly and clumsily titled E.V. Fortschrittliche Verkerherstechnik (“Eingetragener Verein,” or “Registered Society, Progress in Advanced Transport (Transportation) Technology,” or EVFV). The arrangement was made rapidly, probably in December 1933, and was headquartered at Berlin, S.W.29, Bergmanstrasse. Already, on 4 January 1934, under the dual signatures of von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley, who assumed the respective titles of President and Vice-President of the new Society, they wrote the following letter to “new” and prospective members of the EVFV (i.e. a segment of those in the former VfR):

“The undersigned request to advise you through this communication, that they have resigned as president and vice-president, respectively, of the VfR. The primary reason for this is that the suit against Nebel has been dismissed because of insufficient proofs and in consideration of the fact that Nebel has no previous convictions. Therefore, no possibility existed any longer to perform fruitful work within the framework of the VfR, particularly as the completely unsuccessful start in Magdeburg (with which the name of the VfR was closely associated in spite of all efforts to the contrary) curtailed almost completely further possibilities of work. It appears that in realization of this situation, following the resignation of the responsible Board members, a part of the other Board members has also declared being disinterested in the VfR. As of now, it is not clear whether the VfR will dissolve itself, or it will become a private institution of Mr. Nebel.”

“The undersigned previously responsible Board members of the VfR,” they went on, “now takes over the equivalent positions in the Registered Society, Progress in Advanced Communications Technology which exists since 1920; Dr. (Otto) Steinitz is already known to the members of the VfR as a pioneer in rocket matters as a representative of the patents of Prof. Oberth. We would like to take this opportunity to call attention to his great merits during the founding of the German Test Center for Aeronautics and during the development of the Propeller (Driven) Railroad.”

Steinitz, then a well-known aeronautical engineer specializing in aircraft internal combustion engines and propeller design, was especially known as a champion of the development of the high-speed, propeller-driven railroad. Afterward, he became interested in the possibilities of rocket propulsion and was a member of the original Registered Society, Progress in Advanced Transport (Transportation) Technology. He also became a patent attorney and it appears that through this activity, besides his other interests, he came to know Oberth and known to Ley. But there is evidence in an article on the Raketenflugplatz in the Berlin journal Luft- und Kraftfahrt for 15 February 1931 that Steinitz was already well known to the VfR that early and even includes a picture of him with Ley, admiring a Mirak 1 on a stand at the Raketenflugplatz. At any rate, around the time of the collapse of the VfR, the EVFV was hastily “reorganized” to absorb remnants of the former VfR with Steinitz now chosen to serve as its “Chairman.” This also explains why the EVFV as a successor to the VfR did not have a spaceflight and/or rocket oriented name.

“We are of the opinion,” the letter of von Dickhuth-Harrach and Ley continued, “that the ideals and the old traditions of the VfR shall not be allowed to perish with it. And, furthermore, we believe that the representation of these ideals cannot continue anywhere better than in the Registered Society, Progress in Advanced Communications Technology. We are therefore urging you to follow in our footsteps and help us to achieve in the EVFV what we were not able to achieve in the VfR because of Mr. Nebel's personal interest; spreading and deepening the idea of rocketry, and a scientific, serious advancement of rocket technology without sensationalism and without unilateral commitments.”

“The dues for the EVFV,” they concluded, “which until now were higher, have been reduced by us to 8 RM (Reichmarks) per year; they can be paid quarterly...We shall inform you regarding a regular information bulletin...Best wishes for the New Year. Heil Hitler!”^[31]

Ley kept Pendray informed of the gist of what had happened and about a month later, on 2 February 1934, he told his American friend: “Well, it was difficult and not (a) very pleasant job(,) the whole mess but I thought...(I would) better...do it at once. Later on it would have been even more difficult and nasty. But the 'new' (sic.) Society is arranged and I think its (sic.) nobody left of the Nebel crowd...”^[32]

But it was apparently not until as late as the September 1934 issue of Astronautics, of the now re-named American Rocket Society (ARS), that the American rocket community as a whole first learned of the “new” German organization. However, outside Pendray, who had known what had really led to the collapse of the VfR, the majority of the ARS membership were kept from this knowledge. Probably to be as diplomatic as he could and spare the membership the terrible complications that led to the downfall. Yet, the collapse of the VfR was incorrectly also attributed in part to the Nazi regime which had technically not been the case. Whether it was deliberate or inadvertent on Pendray's part, this misconception about the causes of the end of the VfR became accepted and was perpetuated in the literature for years thereafter.

Under the heading of “News of German Experimenters” was to be found the following: “Following the Hitler revolution in Germany, and partly due to internal dissention, the famous Verein für Raumschiffahrt, at one time the largest society of astronautics (sic.) and rocket enthusiasts in the world, was dissolved. It has been succeeded by a new organization, which bears the difficult name of E.V. Fortschrittliche Verlerhestechnik. Willy Ley, secretary and vice-president of the old Verein, has like offices in the new organization, and is its moving spirit. The president is Major (Ret.) Hans-Wolf von Dickhuth-Harrach, the well-known German aeronaut (sic.). It expected that active experimental work will begin soon, carrying on the fine achievements of the old Society at its Raketenflugplatz.”^[33]

However, although there is no evidence the EVFV ever took up “active experimental work,” this group did not suffer the “slow death” as Ley had so drastically stated in his 1944 book, Rockets - The Future of Travel Beyond the Stratosphere. On the contrary, as early as February 1934, this organization began publishing a journal, Das Neue Fahrzeug (The New Vehicle), although bearing the misprinted year of 1933 instead of 1934. Ley wrote the opening lead article, “Eie ersten Postraketen” (“The First Mail Rockets”). Moreover, Das Neue Fahrzeug lasted some 20 issues and appeared as late as May 1937. The EVFR also appeared on the list of “Rocket Societies” compiled by Cedric Giles published in Astronautics for December 1944 in which it is mentioned that the group had been “reorganized” in 1933 by both Ley and “Dr. Steinitz.” In all probability, the EVFV may have ended far earlier, around 1937, when it ceased publishing its journals.

Further coverage of the EVFR is beyond the scope of this treatment except to say that Das Neue Fahrzeug was, in some issues, comparable to the old Die Rakete in featuring several articles on the theory of spaceflight. Examples are: von Pirquet's series, “On the Question of Feasibility of Spaceflight with the Means of Modern Technology,” and Steinitz's “On the Stability of the Space Rocket.”

Yet since the EVFR's mission was “to promote transportation technology on land, water, air, and space, as important means of culture...(as well as to contribute towards) popular enlightenment and fostering practical invention,” Das Neue Fahrzeug also contained articles on other forms of transportation technology, like a piece on the airship Hindenburg by von Dickhuth-Harrach and another on a Berlin auto show by Steinitz. There were other spaceflight advocate groups in Germany, both, during the VfR years and afterwards, before World War II, such as the Gesellschaft für Weltraumforschung e.V. (Society for the Exploration of Space, Registered Society), or GfW, formed in 1937 by Hans K. Kaiser as an arm of the Breslau Astronomy Society that produced its own journal, Weltraum (Space). But these too are outside the scope of the present study.^[34]

It needs be noted as well that while these spaceflight advocate groups were allowed to exist in Germany during the Nazi regime, they did not carry articles on the potential application of the rocket for military purposes but rather the possibility of rockets for spaceflight (or for carrying mail, as another example) seemed innocuous enough and were permitted; but apparently they were never allowed to experiment. In other words, censorship and other restrictions were imposed that are now briefly summarized. Click here to see Part Nine.

Chapter 1, Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7

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Footnotes

1. ^  ^{Ley, Missiles, Rockets, pp. 157-158.}
2. ^  ^{Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 158; Willy Ley, “The Dawn of the Conquest of Space,” Astounding Stories, Vol. XIX, March 1937, p. 109 (a non-fiction article, even though it appeared in an American science fiction magazine); Ley, typed draft, “Around European Rocketry”; Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich (The Free Press: New York, 1995), p. 25.}
3. ^  ^{Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 158.}
4. ^  ^{Ley, Missiles, Rockets, pp. 157-161; Winter, Prelude, pp. 44-48; Sänger Bredt and Engel, pp. 225-227; Jelnina and Rohrwild, pp. 45-46, 50-52; Frank E. Reitz, Die Magdeburger Pilotenrakete: 1933, Auf dem weg Zur Bemannenten Raumfahrt? (Mitteldt. Verlag: Halle, (Germany) 1998), passim; Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, pp. 25-27; Miller, The Dream Machines, pp. 214-216; Nebel, Der Narren, pp. 125-131; von Braun, “Reminiscences,” pp. 135-136; (Rudolf Nebel), “Die Magdeburger Pilotenrakete!” Raketenflug – Mitteilungen des Raketenfluplatzes Berlin, Nr. 8, April 1933, passim (pp. 1-4).}
5. ^  ^{“Man-Carrying Rocket Planned,” Astronautics, No. 25, December-January 1933, p. 7; “Germans Plan First Rocket Flight With Pilot; Magdeburg Sanctions Attempt in Spring,” New York Times, 18 December 1932, p. 1.}
6. ^  ^{Jelnina and Rhorwild, pp. 45-46.}
7. ^  ^{Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 159; Jelnina and Rohrwild, p. 46.}
8. ^  ^{National Archives (Archives II), College Park, Md., RG 330 (Record Group 330), Foreign Scientist Case Files, Box 396, “Kurt Hanisch” file; “Kurt Heinisch, der erste Raketenpilot,” article probably in the Neue Magdeburger Tagblatt, unknown date in June 1933, page unknown, copy in possession of Frank H. Winter; Reitz, p. 110; Günzel, pp. 79, 82; Sänger Bredt and Engel, p. 226; Willy Ley, “Rocketeering or the Hunting of a Canard,” Flight (London), Vol. 31 17 May 1937, p. 535; Letter, Zoike; Postcard, in Willy Ley papers, NASM, Box 31, folder 4. The postcard was at least published by Verlag E. Baensch jun. AG., Magdeburg.}
9. ^  ^{Sänger Bredt and Engel, pp. 226-227; Jelnina and Rhorwild, p. 50.}
10. ^  ^{(Probably Rudolf Nebel), “Raketenflug - Bericht vom Raketenflugplatz Reinickendorf,” Technik voran! Zeitschrift des Reichsbundes Deutscher Technik E.V., 15 Jahrg., Heft (Issue) 21, 5 November 1933, pp. 365-368; Same article, without a byline, in Raketenflug -- Mitteilungen des Raketenflugplatzes Berlin (edited by Nebel), Nr. 9, May 1934, pp. 1-3; Sänger Bredt and Engel, p. 226; Jelnina and Rohrwild, p. 50; Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 159; Rietz, p. 100.}
11. ^  ^{“Raketenflug,” pp. 365-366; Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 159.}
12. ^  ^{“Raketenflug,” p. 366; Ley, Missiles, Rockets, pp. 159-160; Jelnina and Rohrwild, p. 50.}
13. ^  ^{“Raketenflug,” p. 366; Sänger Bredt and Engel, p. 226; Jelnina and Rhorwild, p. 50; Reitz, pp. 119-120.}
14. ^  ^{“Raketenflug,” p. 367; Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 160.}
15. ^  ^{“Raketenflug,” p. 367; Jelnina and Rohrwild, p. 50; Ley, Missiles, Rockets, p. 160.}
16. ^  ^{“Raketenflug,” pp. 368-368.}
17. ^  ^{Ley, Rockets, Missiles, p. 203; Interview, Herbert Schaefer, and other discussions with him, by Frank H. Winter; von Braun, “Reminiscences,” p. 130; Ley, “The Dawn,” p. 109; Ley, “The End of the Rocket Society (– Part 2),” p. 72.}
18. ^  ^{Sänger and Engel, p. 227; Ley, Rockets, Missiles, p. 157.}
19. ^  ^{(Willy Ley and Hans-Wolf von Dickhuth-Harrach), “List of the Cases of 'Meritorious Service' of Eng. Nebel for the German Rocket Society” (sic.), with cover sheet signed by Ley, New York, 21 August 1943,” in, Willy Ley Collection, National Air and Space Museum, Archives, Box 31, file 3; Ley, Rockets - The Future, p.}
20. ^  ^{Ley, Rockets, Missiles, p. 157; Ley, “The End of the Rocket Society (– Part 2),” p. 72. Ley goes into more detail on this legal case in his 1943 article, footnoted above, and in his 1944 book, Rockets - The Future of Travel Beyond the Stratosphere, p. 153.}
21. ^  ^{Hans-Wolf von Dickhuth-Harrach, “Saubere Wirtschaft,” Raketentechnik (Mimeographed bulletin of the Verein für Raumschiffahrt, Berlin), Nr. 1, 1 November 1933, pp. 1-2, copy in “Germany, 1933-1935” file, NASM; Neufeld, Rocket and the Reich, p. 27.}
22. ^  ^{Peterson, “Engineering Consent: Peenemünde (sic.), National Socialism, and the V-2 Missile, 1924-1945,” on-line doctoral thesis, pp. 72-73; also as Michael B. Peterson, Missiles for the Fatherland: Peenemünde, National Socialism, and the V-2 Missile (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2009 ), pp. 45-46; Michael J. Neufeld, Review, on-line, in “Editorial Reviews,” Peterson's Missiles for the Fatherland, [35]}
23. ^  ^{“Achtung: Aenderung! Mitgliederversammlung Berlin,” (VfR), Raketentechnik, 1 November 1933, p. 3; Ley, Rockets, Missiles, pp. 161-162.}
24. ^  ^{Ley, Rockets, Missiles, p. 161.}
25. ^  ^{Frederick I. Ordway III and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team (Thomas Y. Crowell: New York, 1970), p. 20; (Herbert Schaefer), “Extracts from Notebooks Pertaining to the Raketenflugplatz Berlin,” penciled chronology by Schaefer, in “Herbert Schaefer” file, NASM; Application of Herbert Edward Schaefer, “Directory of Aeronautical Engineering of the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences,” 5 December 1943, in “Herbert Schaefer” file, NASM. On Schaefer's still existing application for membership in the (American) Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences, he put down the exact date of 27 January 1934 when he had completed his position as a “Design and Laboratory Engineer” with the Raketenflugplatz. This, however, was probably when his Arbeitsdienst appointment to the Raketenflugplatz officially ended, rather than the official close of the facility or the VfR.}
26. ^  ^{von Braun, “Reminiscences,” p. 130; Ley, Rockets, Missiles, p. 160; Jelnina and Rohrwild, p. 35; Raketenflug – Mittleilungen des Raketenflugplatzes Berlin, May 1934, passim. Incidentally, the last page of the issue (p. 4), presents a most interesting reprint of a report by Dr. Ritter of the Chemisch-Technische Reichsantalt in which it is stated that the undersigned (Ritter) on 26 April 1933 had, “participated in a recent burning test in Reinickendorf, which also gasoline was burned with (liquid) oxygen. From the measurements gained an outflow (exhaust) velocity of the combustion gases of 757 m /sec (2,483.5 ft/sec) and recoil force (thrust) of 115 kg (253 lb.) resulted during a time of 11.5 sec for a total consumption of gasoline and oxygen of 17 kg (37.4 lb.).” From this, Ritter concluded that exhaust velocity had not changed” for “the type of operating material and the combustion remained the same. A substantial progress, however, is that the control of combustion is much safer, and that it is able to handle larger amounts of fuel...This results in a much higher recoil force (thrust) than before (and)...is sufficient now to make a rocket with remarkable payload against gravity to climb and accelerate well.” Also, on 30 October 1933, Ritter witnessed “cinematographic recordings” (films) which showed that “launches are often achieved with a liquid fuel rocket.” Overall, Ritter found that the “constant rocket engine” had made “a remarkable practical success...” Thus, if the above is true, is clear that during the rushed preparations for Project Magdeburg, the wily Nebel was hedging his bets in the event the project would not work and using his contacts with Ritter to arrive at the “proof” he needed that it was directly due to him (Nebel) that the liquid-propellant rocket motor had vastly improved since 1930, and were still greatly promising for further applications. However, this hitherto unknown, second “official” test by Dr. Ritter of the Chemisch-Technische Reichsantalt was to no avail due to the total failure of Magdeburg on top of the subsequent downfall of the VfR and loss of the Raketenflugplatz, and the latter test was never publicized as was the first test, and thus becomes relegated as a mere footnote in the history of the VfR.}
27. ^  ^{Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, p. 27; Winter, Prelude, p. 89; Ley, Rockets - The Future, p. 153; Schaefer, “Extracts,” p. 11; “Ley, Willy,” Current Biography, Vol. 1, June 1941, p. 50; Pacific Book Auction Galleries (Seattle, Washington), catalog, Sale 223...June 14, 2001, Fine & Rare Books, n.p. (sale of Herbert Schaefer collection of books on rocketry), n.p., copy, in “Herbert Schaefer” file, NASM; Cleator, Rockets Through Space, p. 157; Lady Drummond-Hay, “Gossip of the World,” The Mentor-World Traveler (New York), Vol. 22, October 1930, segment titled “Rocketing to the Moon,” pp. 25-26. Ley left Germany on 7 January 1935 and first went to London to visit P.E. Cleator of the British Interplanetary Society, in Liverpool, where he remained for two weeks. He later left for the U.S. on the White Star Cunard liner Olympic, arriving in New York City on 21 February 1935 and first stayed in the home of Pendray before settling for good elsewhere in New York. For more on Ley's overall career, consult, among other sources, Moskowitz, “The Willy Ley Story,” cited above, pp. 30- 42. As for Schaefer, after working as an engineer for various firms after coming to the U.S. in 1936, he eventually found a position at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Ala., in December 1959 and thus rejoined some of his former VfR colleagues; then, eight months later when the von Braun team was transferred to NASA in 1960, he likewise transferred to NASA and completed the remained of his career with the space agency; in 1969 he was transferred to NASA Headquarters at Washington, D.C. and apparently his last position was with NASA's Upper Stages Office. Also in regard to Cleator, he noted in his Rockets Through Space that soon after his visit to the Raketenflugplatz, “Ley thoughtfully furnished a list of people who had been members of, or communicated with, the Verein für Raumschiffahrt. One of those names was Professor A.M. Low...” Thus, Cleator was not the only Englishman during this period who had established connections with the VfR. We also know from an article by the then, well known glamorous British journalist and strong supporter of aviation, Lady Drummond-Hay, appearing in The Mentor-World Traveler (New York) for October 1930 that in that year the VfR had also contacted her, to help generate further publicity on the Society. The article, titled “Gossip of the World,” was mainly about aviation, but also included a segment sub-titled “Rocketing to the Moon” that spoke of the VfR contacting her. While not an aviatrix herself, Lady Drummond-Hay was renowned for being the first woman to fly around the world, in a Zeppelin, and she wrote articles in mainstream U.S. newspapers in the late-1920s and early-30s about her adventures.}
28. ^  ^{Ley, “The End of the Rocket Society (– Part 2),” p. 74; Ley, Rockets - The Future, pp. 149-150.}
29. ^  ^{“Zum Tode Reinhold Tilings,” Raketentechnik, 1 November 1933, pp. 2-3; Ley, Rockets, Missiles, p. 156; “Erste Flüssigkeitsrakete in USA,” Raketentechnik, 1 November 1933, p. 3; Goddard and Pendray, The Papers, Vol. III, pp. 1662-1664; Winter, Prelude, pp. 81, 120; “`Männer der Rakete,'” Raketentechnik, 1 November 1933, p. 3; “Start der ersten bemannten Rakete im Frühjahre in Magdeburg (also contains mention to Tiling's visit to the Raketenflugplatz), Raketenflug, Nr. 7, December 1932, p. 4; (Rudolf Nebel), “Pulveraketen - Flüssigsraketen - Ein Vergleich,” Raketenflug, Nr. 3, March 1932, pp. 1-3. For more on Tiling, see Ley, Rockets, Missiles, pp. 146-147, 156-157, and other sources. There is also the recently published dedicated book on Tiling, Klaus Tiling and Martin Frauenheim, Reinhold Tiling - Flieger und Forscher, Erfinder der Kammerrakete (Verlag für Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik: Diepholz and Berlin, 2013).}
30. ^  ^{Ley, Rockets - The Future, pp. 149-150.}
31. ^  ^{Open Letter, Hans-Wolf von Dickhuth-Harrach and Willy Ley, 4 January 1934, copy in “”Germany, 1930-1934” file, NASM; D.M. Farmer, “The Fiftieth Birthday of Dr. Otto Steinitz,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 4, February 1937, pp. 10-11; Dr. S. (Dr. Otto Steinitz?), “Der Raketenflugplatz des Vereins für Raumschiffahrt,” Luft- und Kraftfahrt, 11 Jahrg., 15 February 1931, p.1. Note that this article even seems to have been authored by Steinitz and in the text, he is mentioned as Oberth's patent attorney and in this way being involved in the invention of Oberth's launch rack.}
32. ^  ^{Letter, G. Edward to Pendray to Willy Ley, 2 February 1934, in G. Edward Pendray Papers, copy in “Willy Ley file,” NASM.}
33. ^  ^{“News of German Experimenters,” Astronautics, No. 29, September 1934, p. 9.}
34. ^  ^{Winter, Prelude, pp. 48-51; Cedric Giles, “The Rocket Societies,” Astronautics, No. 60, December 1944, p. 12. Consult, Winter, Prelude, pp. 48-51, for more on the other German spaceflight advocate groups during this period.}