Jul 8 1985

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Vice President George Bush, after meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand and other French leaders in Paris, said the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and the European French-sponsored Eureka technology program were not incompatible, Defense Daily reported. Seeking to calm concerns that the Eureka program was in competition with SDI for scientific and technology talent, Bush said that after his talks with the French that "I more firmly believe . . . there is no incompatibility between Eureka. . .and SDI. . .

"They understand our research program, which is strictly related to strategic defense, and I think we understand much more clearly their concept of collective research on broad technology as far as Europe is concerned," Bush commented.

Technology ministers from 16 European countries had scheduled a meeting for July 17 in Paris to discuss projects and areas of cooperation in the Eureka program. Five areas of high technology were identified for joint programs: information technology, robotics, communications, bio-technology, and new materials. (D/D, July 8/85, 1)

NASA announced that its Ames-Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) would begin a series of simulated airline flights to test two experimental laminar air flow control devices. Previous research had shown that laminar air flow could reduce aerodynamic drag from 25 to 40% and thus provide significant fuel savings under laboratory conditions. However, in actual flight insects, ice, and other obstructions adhering to the leading edges of an aircraft's wings could disrupt laminar flow.

Ames-DFRC had installed on its business-sized JetStar aircraft the two experimental laminar control flow devices and would simulate airline service flights in widely separated areas of the U.S. to experience a wide variety of contaminant conditions. NASA would conduct the simulated airline service flights just as an airline would under normal air traffic rules and regulations.

During the test, researchers planned up to four flights each day over a two-week period to gather as much information as possible on the test articles' performance.

The test article installed on the left wing used suction through 27 0.003-in. spanwise slots on the upper and lower surface to maintain laminar flow. A propylene glycol methyl ether (PGME)/water mixture discharged through several slots at the wing leading edge and flowing back over the wing provided ice and insect impact protection. Lockheed-Georgia manufactured the article for NASA.

The test article on the right wing used suction through approximately 1 million 0.0025-in. diameter holes in the titanium skin to maintain laminar flow on the upper surface of the article. For insect protection, a shield, which retracted at 6,000 feet altitude, extended much like a wing leading edge flap on commercial transports. Spray nozzles behind the shield could spray the PGME/water mixture on the test article for additional insect protection. For additional ice prevention, glycol was forced through the wing's porous metal section of the shield leading edge. McDonnell-Douglas manufactured the article for NASA.

The JetStar would carry a Knollenberg probe, mounted atop the aircraft, to measure the number and size of ice and water particles encountered in flight. A charge patch, located on the pylon that held the probe, would measure the static electric charge caused by particles in the air rubbing across the patch surface, thus giving a qualitative measure of ice and water particles. Correlation of the probe and patch data could calibrate the charge measurement in a simple cockpit display. (NASA Release 85-101)

In an internal memorandum Assistant Defense Secretary James Wade Jr. asked the Air Force why F-15 and F-16 fighter jets were getting more-rather than less-expensive to build as time went on, the Washington Times reported. The cost of an aircraft normally decreased over the years because the high initial costs of design, engineering, and getting an assembly line into operation were no longer charged.

The memo said the price of the F-15-calculated in 1970 dollars-rose from $5.5 million to $7.4 million a plane in 1985. In current dollars, an F-15 cost 26.3 million. The price of an F-16, in 1975 dollars, rose from $3.9 million in 1980 to $4.8 million in 1984. In current dollars, the plane cost $14 million. McDonnell Douglas Corp. had been making F-15s since 1970; General Dynamics Corp. started building F-16s in 1975.

A Pentagon spokesman said the Air Force was working on a response. However, Pentagon documents provided to Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) showed construction hours for both aircraft were well above engineering predictions. A single F-15 was supposed to take 22,978 man hours to build; during the first quarter of 1984, McDonnell Douglas needed 37,193 man hours to complete a plane, the documents reported. An F-16 was supposed to take 837,300 man hours to build; in the first quarter of 1984, General Dynamics took 1.4 million man hours to build a plane. (W Times, July 8/85, 10C)

Langley Research Center (LaRC) announced that NASA would sponsor an exhibition July 22 through July 30 at the 1985 National Scout Jamboree at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. The jamboree, celebrating scouting's 75th anniversary, was expected to draw more than 35,000 U.S. and international scouts and leaders and many thousands of general public participants.

The NASA exhibit, for which LaRC was serving as lead coordinator, would include information on subjects ranging from current aeronautics research to the Space Shuttle and man's future in space. A 100-seat theater would have video presentations and live programs throughout each day. Astronaut Frederick Gregory, a former scout and long-time scouting enthusiast, would participate in the jamboree's opening program on July 24 and would talk with scouts in the NASA exhibition area on that day.

NASA would sponsor July 24 through 28 model rocket launch demonstrations and presentations on earning the Space Exploration merit badge. (LaRC Release 85-38)

Recently completed agreements between insurance underwriters and Hughes Communications Services acknowledged loss of the disabled Leasat-3 spacecraft but established a plan under which Hughes and the underwriters would share in communication lease revenues if a plan to repair the satellite during the Space Shuttle 51-I mission was successful, Aviation Week reported.

Under the agreement with American and European underwriters who insured Leasat-3, Hughes would provide the funds, estimated at about $10 million, for the rescue attempt. If the rescue was successful, Hughes would regain the cost of the salvage mission through initial lease revenues. The agreements recognized a loss of $85 million for the spacecraft and launch costs.

The loss resulted from the failure of the spacecraft on April 13 to activate during an automatic deployment sequence after the spacecraft was ejected from the Space Shuttle orbiter Discovery's cargo bay [see Space Transportation System/Missions, Apr. 17].

Hughes and NASA were developing equipment and procedures to mount the rescue attempt. Johnson Space Center had concluded a critical design review for rescue hardware such as a work site, stowage assembly, and the capture, handling, grapple, and spinup bars that would be used to stabilize, restrain, and spin the satellite once modifications aimed at restoring ground control were made on orbit. The design review also covered components Hughes was building, such as the remote power unit, spun bypass unit, and a checkout box that would be used to test electronic components on orbit prior to the rescue attempt.

Completion of the critical design review enabled NASA to obtain information on the electronic components Hughes was building and to build rescue equipment for the mission, conduct vacuum chamber testing, and begin training for the salvage mission.

NASA had already conducted initial neutral buoyancy training in the weightless training environment facility and mass simulation tests in preparation for the mission. (Av Wk, July 8/85, 24)

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