Oct 3 1963
From The Space Library
First official Soviet comment on President Kennedy's proposal for U.S.-U.S.S.R. lunar cooperation came from Russian news agency Tass. While not identifying the proposal with the President, Tass said: "Maybe it is too early to discuss now the question what is better-to combine a Soviet rocket with an American spaceship or to include an American in the Soviet space crew, but first steps in cooperation cannot but give satisfaction." A few hours later, Cosmonaut Pavel Popovich made an unscheduled talk on Moscow Radio, calling for a "common effort by the peoples of all states of our planet" to solve the earthly difficulties that hinder man's flight to the stars. (Wash.. Post, 10/4/63)
Rep. Thomas M. Pelly (R.-Wash.) charged that President Kennedy had completely reversed U.S. space policy in his U.N. speech of Sept. 20 by shifting the objective of the manned lunar landing from one of international competition and world prestige to one of cooperation with the Russians. He opposed the new proposal but said it offered justification to cut back the manned spaceflight program and substitute cheaper unmanned flights. (R, 10/3/63,17666)
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson quoted in article in Washington Daily News as saying of the manned lunar landing program: "To default would be as catastrophic as if we had defaulted exploration of the atom" (Text)
In commenting to the Senate Committee on Government Operations on the bill (S.1577) authorizing the General Services Administration to "coordinate and otherwise provide" automatic data processing equipment for all Federal agencies, NASA noted that on June 30, 1963, NASA had 118 general-purpose digital computer systems, of which only seven were used full time for administrative purposes. The rest were used in science and engineering tasks. (NASA Leg. Act. Rpt. II/158 cont'd)
Thomas J. Watson, Jr., chairman of the board of International Business Machines Corp.; speaking at the 46th annual meeting of the American Council on Education in Washington, D.C., expressed concern about the current course of education. "That concern has its origin just 6 years ago tomorrow. It was the day that the Soviet Union put Sputnik I in orbit. Do you remember the thoughts which flooded in on us that day? Thoughts of embarrassment-dismay-concern. . . . We could even try to say that satellites were just stunts, that Sputnik was a silly hunk of iron. But try as we would to whistle in the dark, Americans finally had to reach the conclusion that the Russians had outdistance us at least temporarily in the exploration of space, a pursuit which in our century might well become as important as the exploration of the oceans had been in the time of Columbus and Magellan." Mr. Watson pointed out that the impact of Sputnik on education "has thrown the sciences and the humanities badly out of balance.... In the fiscal year of 1961, of all Federal funds for basic research, the physical and biological sciences got 97 percent. "There are many traditional reasons for reemphasizing the humanities which today are more important than ever. "In the first place, a thorough grounding in the humanities is vital training for many leaders who can wisely manage people as well as sufficiently manage machines. This need exists in universities, in public service, and in business. "Secondly, as our planet continues to shrink, we will more and more have to become citizens of the world. We must acquire a better understanding of the language, history, and culture of people of other lands. With present day mass-destruction weapons, this understanding is not just desirable-it's vital. "Finally, the greater our skills in the humanities-in literature and the arts-the greater our capacity for a constructive use of leisure time, which is bound to increase as machines lift old burdens from men's shoulders and minds. "On this sixth anniversary of the flight of Sputnik, we can be sure of one thing; no second sputnik will come along to jolt us into action, and do for American education in the humanities what the first Sputnik did for American education in the sciences." (CR, 11/12/63, A7010-A7012)
General Accounting Office (GAO) released report on NASA's Centaur booster which was sharply critical of both Government and contractor performance. Done at the request of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics and submitted to them on March 29, 1963, but not released until Oct. 3, the report charged that poor management, and program slippage had added $100 million to the cost of the program. The most significant charge in the report was that NASA and the contractor--General Dynamics/Astronautics-had in their possession in 1960 data from which could have been predicted the failure of the first test flight in 1962. The only immediate reply came from Julian Scheer, NASA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning: "On Sept. 30, 1962, we moved the Centaur project from Marshall Space Flight Center at Huntsville to the Lewis Research Center because we knew we had problems. Still, we hope to fly Centaur by the end of this year." (Wash. Post, 10/4/63; Space Bus. Daily, 10/4/63, 25)
Reporting under a NASA contract to study requirements for a manned mission to Mars in "the unfavorable (1975-1985) time period," Douglas Aircraft Co.'s Missile and Space Systems Div. proposed a nuclear-chemical four-stage vehicle carrying a seven man crew on a 400-day trip. Mission would begin out of 300-mile earth orbit: first stage would boost vehicle into Mars trajectory; 140 days later, second stage would put vehicle into 300-mile orbit of Mars, where for 20 days the crew would study the planet; third stage would provide escape from Mars and 240-day trip back to earth; fourth stage would provide retrothrust for re-entry. (Space Bus. Daily, 10/4/63, 27)
October 3-4: Project Mercury Summary. Conference held at MSC, Houston, Tex. Two days of papers were presented on various aspects of Project Mercury as a whole and on the final, 22-orbit flight by Astronaut Leroy Gordon Cooper in particular. The most controversial point raised during the conference was statement on the large amount of faulty or careless manufacture and assembly of Mercury spacecraft. On the MA-9 backup spacecraft, for example, some 720 discrepancies were recorded, of which 526 were attributable to unsatisfactory workmanship and 444 of these required specially scheduled time to correct. (MSC Releases 63-153-158; Project Mercury Summary)
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