Mar 2 1964

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NASA and DOD established the National Space Station Planning Sub-Panel of the NASA-DOD Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), charged with studying and then making recommendations to AACB on the best configuration for follow-on manned space station to the MOL. Co-chairmen were Dr. Michael L. Yarymovych of NASA Advanced Manned Missions Office and Col. Kenneth Schultz, Deputy Director of Development Planning for Space, Hq. USAF. (M&R, 3/9/64, 13; SBD, 3/11/64, 383)

Apollo spacecraft boilerplate command module and related equipment for first full-scale test flight of Apollo launch escape system arrived at White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex., where it would be flight-tested with Little Joe II booster. (MSC Release 64-39)

NASA announced Hughes Aircraft Co. had been awarded contract to develop and build five Advanced Technological Satellites (ATS) based on Advanced Syncom design study. The 650-lb. satellites would be used to test several spacecraft techniques, particularly spacecraft stabilization and orientation in higher altitudes. (NASA Release 64-50; Goddard News, 3/9/64, 8)

White House released report by Eugene R. Black and Stanley deJ. Osborne recommending revision of U.S. program to develop supersonic transport.. As previously disclosed (Feb. 11, 22) , the report urged Government financing be increased from 75% to 90% and the program be administered by a new, independent agency. (MacKenzie, Wash. Post, 3/3/64, A24)

Dr. Charles A. Berry (M.D.) was named Chief of Medical Programs for NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, SC Director Dr. Robert R. Gilruth announced. In this new position Dr. Berry would be in charge of all medical and physiological matters in the SC mission. Promoted to Dr. Berry's vacated position, Chief of Medical Operations, was Dr. D. Owen Coons (M.D.), formerly Deputy Chief. (MSC Release 64 40)

AEC released report from its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards concerning NASA Plum Brook Reactor Facility (PBRF). After reviewing NASA's application to convert its provisional operating license to 10-year operating license, the Committee concluded that "with careful planning and operation, the NASA PBRF organization can continue to operate this facility without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public." (AEC Release G-46)

Sen. Stephen M. Young (D.-Ohio) spoke in Senate of NASA'S selecting Boston as site for new electronics research center, charging that "there is little to indicate that thorough evaluation was given to potential locations distant from the Boston area" and pointing out that "in all respects, Cleveland eminently qualifies for this important new facility." . . Each time a new facility is proposed, we hear the same well-worn argument that it should go to an area which already has institutions with experience in this field. As a result a vicious cycle has formed, and it can almost be predicted that any new important space facility will go to Boston, Houston, or to California. . . . "Frankly, I am tired of the argument. I rise today to speak briefly in protest of what has been going on. . . ." (CR, 3/2/64, 3943-44)

Milton B. Ames, Jr., Director of Space Vehicles in NASA Office of Advanced Research and Technology, testified before House Committee on Science and Astronautics' Subcommittee on Advanced Research and Tracking:" . space vehicle research, first of all, produces knowledge that permits the accomplishment of new missions. When the knowledge resulting from research is obtained well in advance of the planning of new missions, we may proceed with confidence that the missions are feasible. For this reason, the generation of new knowledge through research should, when possible, precede developments that are beyond the current state of the art. Only when the pressures for immediate development are extremely great, as has been the case in these first years of our national space program, are we justified in violating the principle of order in favor of expediency. When we possess adequate research data, we not only are confident of the feasibility of any new missions for which we may wish to plan, but we also . .. lay the basis for improved reliability and efficiency and for reductions in the weight and cost of the space vehicles required for these missions. The truth of these principles has been demonstrated many times in the past by costly developments which either had to be abandoned for lack of the necessary technical capability to complete them or which could only be salvaged by crash research programs. "We must, therefore, strive through research to develop new knowledge that Will make new space missions possible, if and when national policy should dictate that any one of these missions must be accomplished. At the same time We must conduct the research required to ensure the success of ongoing projects, and we must also strive through research to pave the way for increased reliability and efficiency of space vehicles of proven feasibility. . . ." (Testimony)

In interview with Aviation Week and Space Technology, Air Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert replied to question about MOL: "I am sure that the MOL must go forward. I am in sympathy with Mr. McNamara's pressing us to try to define what we hope to do with it. This can have a lot to do with the subsystems that you plan to put in it. Also, the definition effort has to do With the cost, and with the time it is going to take us to do the job. We haven't suffered at any time in the last three years that I have been here by taking a few months to try and work out with reasonable precision what we are planning to do. I am convinced, for one, that the studies and program definition that We went through in the Titan III materially improved our chances of getting a fine booster at lower cost. I know, as Secretary McNamara knows, that there is a limit to the precision with which you can define what you are going to do with something you haven't got. But the effort should be made to set out the parameters. It has the merit, at least, of excluding some of the things you know you are not going to try. I'm convinced Mr. McNamara means exactly what he says-that we have to get this MOL capability, and I'm not disturbed by the efforts that are being made to attempt to define What we mean by a capability. . . ." (Av. Wk., 3/2/64, 73)

Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis E. LeMay said in testimony before House Armed Services Committee that the Titan III launch vehicle program was "proceeding satisfactorily" and that USAF was "undertaking the development of a medium altitude communications satellite program. . . the next major step toward the achievement of future space capabilities is the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) which was approved for development under Air Force management. The MOL will provide a means to fulfill the compelling requirement to acquire information essential to determining accurately the threat from space, the usefulness and the capabilities of man-in-space, and the unique advantages which may accrue from military space operations. It will also serve as a platform to support testing of equipment and procedures in the environment in which they will be used. (AF Info. Pol. Ltr.)

New York Times editorialized that the A-11 experimental aircraft "represents an engineering breakthrough on several fronts and a tribute to Lockheed, but it will not satisfy the need for an advanced manned interceptor, a long-range bomber or a new high-speed commercial craft." (NYT, 3/2/64, 26)

Col. John C. Nickerson (USAF) , 47, a key- figure in USA-USAF Thor-Jupiter controversy, died in automobile accident in Alamagordo, N. Mex. (UPI, Wash. Post, 3/3/64, A2)

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