May 13 1986
From The Space Library
NASA considered both a crew-tended station and one that would be permanently tended. The Phase B study period for the Space Station identified and evaluated alternative systems, components and philosophies that would result in a configuration responsive to the needs of potential users, be cost-effective to operate and maintain, and flexible in terms of growth, size, and capabilities. A crew-tended station could have people aboard only when a Shuttle orbiter docked to it; the orbiter would provide the habitable facilities.
While Congress directed NASA to examine an option "which phases in permanent crew features of the Station," NASA pointed out that the "phased approach would force postponement of experiments important to advancement of manned spaceflight and would increase the total cost of developing the permanently manned Space Station." NASA went on to argue that the savings achieved by the phased approach would be offset by the cost of operating the Station in a crew-tended mode for several years and by the cost of maintaining the industrial base during the delay period before resuming assembly of the permanently tended station. Savings of the crew-tended phase were estimated at $284 million in 1984 dollars and total cost prior to permanently crew-tended capability at $1 billion. (NASA Release 86-59)
NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher appeared before a House Appropriations subcommittee and announced that he had created an independent panel to review NASA's management practices, especially the decision-making process on the morning of the January 28 Challenger accident. The review would require about six to eight months to complete. He also said that Shuttle flights would likely resume by July 1987, with an optimum of seven launches in the first year, and that funding for a replacement Shuttle was his "highest priority." Also present was Deputy Administrator William R. Graham, who told members of Congress that NASA Inspector General Bill Colvin would investigate the transfer of two Morton Thiokol engineers, Allan McDonald and Roger Boisjoly. The two men had vehemently objected to the Challenger launch on the morning prior to its deadly flight and later detailed their scenarios before Congress. He was particularly concerned that NASA engineers might somehow be involved with the reassignments. The subcommittee advised NASA to reevaluate its relationship with the rocket booster manufacturer and threatened to severely reduce NASA's budget for new space programs if the agency did not undergo some drastic changes. (Department of Housing and Urban Development - Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1987, May 13/86; W Times, May 14/86; W Post, May 14/86; WSJ, May 14/86; NY Times, May 14/86; P Inq, May 14/86; C Trib, May 14/86; B Sun, May 14/86)
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