Oct 7 1986
From The Space Library
A House Science and Technology Committee issued a report stating that Congress and the White House shared the blame for the launch schedule pressure that led to the January 28 Challenger accident. The report agreed with many of the findings laid out by the Rogers Commission, but differed by stating that the accident was not a result of poor communication through NASA management, but "poor technical decision-making [by them] over several years." The report concluded that NASA's management lacked the expertise needed to operate the Space Shuttle and warned the Agency not to succumb to similar pressure concerning future flights.
The National Research Council, in an independent study requested by Congress, urged NASA on October 9 to limit its Shuttle flights in the 1990s to 11 or 13, not the 16 annual flights proposed by NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher. (Investigation of the Challenger Accident: Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, Oct 29/68; W Post, Oct 8/86; Oct 10/86; W Times, Oct 8/86; NY Times, Oct 8/86)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
