The Empire Strikes Out - Canada's Defence & The Commonwealth Space Program - Part 5 by Robert Godwin
From The Space Library
While the future of Canada’s aerospace industry was being completely rewritten the pre-arranged Commonwealth Space Symposium finally took place in London on August 27th. Phil Lapp and Arthur Maine hurriedly put together a paper which was right up to date, including the news about the Canadair contract. The pair apologized for what they perceived was a hurried summary of Canada’s aerospace capabilities. They were not able to attend the conference in person, but despite their trepidation their paper, entitled Canadian Facilities, was a brilliant overview and included a mass of statistics from every possible part of the Canadian economy that might be impacted by a space program. They noted that the aircraft industry comprised 39,000 employees and 7.7M square feet of floor space. This was after the 12,500 layoffs at Avro and the loss of 1.7M square feet now under-utilised at that moment. When discussing the electronics industry Lapp noted, “most contributions to the electronic arts arising in Canada have some link with the geography or conditions peculiar to the country.”
He then clearly described Canada’s space future, "In terms of astronautical applications, the industry is well suited to contribute in practically any electronic area with perhaps special ability in communications, tracking, and data handling and processing." He also paid special attention to Canada’s chemical industry which made it perfectly suited to supply propellants derived from its rich resource-base and concocted by its chemical engineers.
At this time many in the astronautics field were actively advocating nuclear propulsion as the best method to open up space travel. Lapp and Maine pointed out that Canada was already a world-leader in advanced nuclear reactors.
At CARDE Lapp’s friend Gerald Bull was also leading the world when it came to building guns capable of accelerating payloads to speeds comparable to a re-entering ICBM. The paper went on to point out that The Defence Research Medical Laboratories, located in Downsview Ontario, were conducting medical experiments involving motion sickness, decompression and cold, and acceleration in a centrifuge. Similar work was underway at A.V. Roe in England, whose Frankenstein subsidiary was leading the development of British space suits.
Canadian universities had over 6000 students enrolled from Commonwealth countries as well as over 400 Canadians attending British institutions. Lapp and Maine also concluded that Canada was uniquely located for a high latitude launch complex for a variety of reasons including the low intensity of the Van Allen radiation belts. This observation drew attention from the delegates because of its eminent practicality, but it stood little chance of being seriously considered because the Woomera launch facility was well under way and the Australian High Commissioner, Sir Eric Harrison, had been there personally to open the conference and to make sure that Australia's interests were front and centre.
Finally, neither Lapp nor Maine had any delusions about Canada being able to go-it-alone.
"Since the British Commonwealth already exists as a freely co-operating group of countries with common interests and traditions, one might suppose that a reasonable measure of success should attend a Commonwealth space program venture. If it could be shown that this would not be the case then the outlook is indeed bleak for the completely international co-operation in space research so keenly sought by IAF and the COSPAR agency of the United Nations. It seems to be imperative that the nations of the world come to a common agreement on the conquest of space, and surely the Commonwealth has a part to play in bringing this about."
The report is so well handled it seems that Phil Lapp had found a new role. Not only did he go on to co-author the so-called Chapman Report in 1967 but he would spend the rest of his life consulting and writing hundreds of complex reports for every branch of the aerospace and resources industries in Canada. If you wanted to know what Canada could do, you asked Phil Lapp.
The British Interplanetary Society had done a superb job of bringing together the various interested parties. Representatives from fourteen foreign nations attended, including two from the Soviet embassy, one from the US Strategic Air Command and four from Israel's ministry of defence. Delegates from India unable to attend had also submitted papers for inclusion. On the second day De Havilland's Geoffrey Pardoe delivered a detailed explanation of the capabilities of Blue Streak leading many delegates to believe that a Commonwealth program was inevitable since the Blue Streak, outfitted with a Black Knight second stage, could outlift most of the US boosters, with the notable exception of Atlas-Agena-Centaur. Leslie R. Shepherd concluded the proceedings by saying that the BIS intended to host another summit in the future.
Two weeks after Canada geared up its aerospace industry to produce the F-104G the USAF announced that they would forthwith be automating their own F-104s to be used as drones for target practice.[1] No aircraft had ever been relegated to such a fate before.
Meanwhile, the Hawker 1127, which could have been built at Avro is still the world's only successful vertical take-off fighter, and would instead be built under license in the USA. After being continuously upgraded it is expected to remain in active service with the US Marine Corps until 2025, making it the most successful fighter in history. The design has not become obsolete, after almost 60 years, even though it is not a supersonic aircraft. It couldn't have effectively defended Canada but it would have made up for that shortcoming with the balance of trade it would have generated. But with the decision to build the F-104G, what little hope that may have remained at Avro was now dashed.
Canada still had to deal with the "new" paradigm, defending against Soviet bombers, which, despite a stream of predictions to the contrary, hadn't all disappeared. By late December discussions were underway to purchase McDonnell's Voodoo aircraft from the United States to reequip the domestic squadrons. USAF General Kuter during a visit to Ottawa said "There will always be need for a manned fighter," somewhat belatedly agreeing with Canada's Chief of Air Staff.[2]
The Voodoo was apparently capable of intercepting Soviet bombers since it could carry nuclear missiles and had a speed of 1200mph and a range of 2000 miles. None of its specifications matched those of the Arrow which had more range, was faster and could carry more armaments.[3] However, the Voodoo was cheaper.
One of the most often quoted critical comments leveled at the Arrow came from a noted expert who said that it "wasn't anything special." While some advocates of the aircraft claim it was better than anything else flying, even today. Both are imprecise statements. The Arrow was special in the sense that it was built to handle "all weather", including the harsh Canadian arctic, over a very large patrol area, with a large inboard weapon system which meant it could achieve and maintain extremely high speed. No other fighter was able to do this until the deployment of the F-22 Raptor in 1996.
The size of the weapon's pod meant that it could have handled air-launched nuclear weapons giving it the same stand-off capability as the large supersonic bombers which were available at that time. The critics rarely ever question the unparalleled power of the Iroquois engine which spoke for itself when it nearly ripped the housings out of the test-stand in Malton, Ontario. At 20,000 lbs of thrust it was more powerful than anything available elsewhere, in part due to its revolutionary design. Even the Velvet Glove missiles the Arrow would have carried would have used propellant designed by Dickinson and others at CARDE, specifically created with the Canadian Arctic in mind and able to withstand the extreme temperature shifts without cracking (a very bad thing to happen in a solid fuel rocket.)
The Arrow was better than anything else, for Canada, at that time. Nine squadrons could have patrolled all 3.5 million square miles. The aircraft excelled in many other critical ways but to say it was superior in every way to modern aircraft is clearly not true. It would be extremely vulnerable to modern radar since the notion of "stealth" technology didn't even exist in 1959.
Randall Whitcomb, a pilot who flew in the Canadian Air Force in multiple fighters including the CF-18 Hornet, conducted an unprecedented analysis of the Arrow. His conclusion in 2008 was,
"The high performance, even when heavily loaded, combined with the capability of the kinds of weapons it could carry, gave the Arrow more potential flexibility than most aircraft built to this day."[4]
In July of 1961 a batch of 66 Voodoos were delivered to the Canadian Air Force to defend the home territory; a job that the Air Force had told the government would require well over a hundred aircraft.[5]
Diefenbaker's cabinet had been advised on April 28 1958 that, in his words, Canada needed an "interceptor that had to be capable of flying at speeds in excess of one thousand miles per hour and at altitudes above fifty thousand feet." Diefenbaker then said "The CF-105 or Avro Arrow, the early flight tests of which indicated its ability to meet, within circumscribed limits, these operational demands."
The original plan was for A.V. Roe to build 500 Arrows at a cost of $2M each, or $1BN. When the government began to believe that aircraft interceptors would soon be obsolete the number required was dropped to 100. This later allowed the detractors to claim that a single aircraft was $10M, and therefore wildly over-priced. However, at $10M, even adjusted for inflation, this is less than half the projected price of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In his memoirs Diefenbaker admitted that the order had dropped to a fifth and the unit cost had gone up five times. He then pointed out that by the time the Arrow was ready "substantially cheaper United States interceptors would be available at end-of-production prices."
He continued, "Certainly the Bomarc serves as a fitting example of why governments are not more decisive on defence issues; the British Blue Streak program might serve as another."
After having asserted that weapon systems were becoming obsolete as fast as they were produced he was essentially admitting that he was happy to buy aircraft that were at the end of their useful life.
After explaining his reasoning for cancelling the Arrow contract, which was complex and involved budgets and exchange rates and other commitments he felt he had to prioritize, he then stated in his memoir, "It was roughly calculated that we would lose five votes for every person whose unemployment was directly attributable to this decision." His argument was that even though he had calculated the political cost of his decision he would not be "blackmailed" by Avro or the press into changing his mind.
Tellingly he then stated, "There is no doubt from a construction standpoint, the Avro Arrow was an impressive aircraft, superior to any other known contemporary all-weather fighter…the Arrow's Iroquois engine boasted the highest thrust, the lowest specific weight, the greatest mass flow, and the greatest potential of all known engines under development."
He then asserted that it didn't have the range necessary for the job "The CF-105 would be able to do nothing but intercept, and only within a range of 150 to 200 miles from its base." This was actually much less than it could have covered and with refueling it was more than capable of keeping up with the Voodoo.
During his face-off with Crawford Gordon when challenged about the impact to Canada's aerospace production capacity, he later stated, "I could agree with Gordon that it was important for Canada to have an independent aircraft industry. If Avro and Orenda went into liquidation, we would still have one: De Havilland would not be affected, nor would the Transport Marine Aircraft Section of Canadair."
His contempt for Avro is plain to see in his memoir. He stated that, "A.V. Roe since the end of World War 2 had lived and grown rich on Canadian defence contracts." Which seems to completely overlook the remarkable achievement of building the first commercial jet passenger aircraft in North America, the C-102 Jetliner which had already been sold in quantity to several airlines but was ordered to be put on the shelf by the Canadian government when the Korean war broke out. The St Laurent government had also foisted the Douglas Sparrow II onto Avro, despite being warned of the costs by the contractor. Money and time were wasted but revealing the truth behind these government flip-flops would only have strengthened Avro's position and do nothing to bolster Diefenbaker's decision to cancel the aircraft.
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